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STERILIZATION ABUSE:
A PROPOSED REGULATORY SCHEME
More Children From the Fit,
Less from the Unfit-That is the
Chief Issue of Birth Control.'
Sterilization, a permanent form of birth control, 2 is becoming one of the
most popular methods, second only to the pill. 3 In 1976, female steriliza-
tion became one of the ten most frequently performed operative procedures
in the United States.4 This popularity is alarming because many of these
sterilizations are performed without informed and voluntary consent to the
procedure.
This Comment will explore sterilization abuse and its relationship to the
philosophy of the population control movement. It then will discuss the con-
stitutionality of state legislation attempting to prevent such abuse. The im-
portance of state sterilization regulations in light of recent case law also will
be presented. Finally, a model regulatory scheme will be proposed, and
possible challenges by the medical profession to the proposed scheme will
be analyzed.
1. T. LITTLEWOOD, THE POLITICS OF POPULATION CONTROL 16 (University of Notre
Dame Press 1977) [hereinafter cited as LITTLEWOOD], citing M. SANGER, BIRTH CONTROL
REVIEW 2 (May 1919).
2. Recently there have been attempts to reverse sterilization through microsurgery. See,
e.g., Gomel, Tubal Reanastomosis by Microsurgery, 28 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 59 (No. 1,
1977). As of January 1978, only 75 cases of microsurgery reversals were reported. Thus, esti-
mates of a 60% success rate based on these carefully selected cases are misleading. Schildkraut,
Sterilization: Now It's Simpler, Safer. Reversible? Maybe, GooD HOUSEKEEPING, Jan. 1978, at
164. The cost can be $3,000 or more. Id. There simply is no reversible method that absolutely
can be depended on. Id. Moreover, the reversal procedure can intensify the risk of an ensuing
ectopic pregnancy, a life threatening condition. See Siegler & Perez, Reconstruction of Fallopian
Tubes in Previously Sterilized Patients, 26 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 383, 386 (No. 5, 1975).
3. Westoff & Jones, Contraception and Sterilization in the United States, 1965-1975, 9
FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTS. 153, 154-55 (No. 4, 1977). It is estimated that from 1960 to 1970 the
number of sterilizations increased from 100,000 to 1,000,000 per year. Wood, Psychosocial As-
pects of Sterilization, 16 CURRENT PSYCH. THERAPIES 303, 305 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Psychosocial Aspects].
4. Hysterectomy was the third most frequent operative procedure (678 per 1000) and fallo-
pian tube sterilization was the ninth (420 per 1000). DEP'T OF SURGICAL PRACTICE OF THE AM.
COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, Socio-ECoNoMIC FACTBOOK FOR SURGERY 1978, 33 (K. Kuntzman &
R. Lance eds. 1978). Tubal ligation is One method of sterilization. It is accomplished by tying,
obstructing, or removing the fallopian tubes. Traditional surgical techniques reach the tubes
through the vagina or abdomen, and require a two to three day hospitalization. The newer
endoscopic procedures can be performed on an outpatient basis. In this procedure, a tiny inci-
sion is made in the abdominal wall and the tubes are cauterized (burned) or clipped. Hysterec-
tomy, on the other hand, is the removal of the uterus and it has a complication rate which is
ten to twenty times higher than that associated with tubal ligations. Caress, Sterilization: Women
Fit To Be Tied, 62 HEALTH PAC. BULL. 1, 2 (Jan./Feb. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Fit To Be
Tied].
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STERILIZATION
The Problem of Abuse
As of 1973, 2.2 million married persons were sterilized. 5 Since unmarried
persons also are sterilized, the total number probably is larger. Several
studies indicate that the demographic incidence of sterilization has a dispro-
portionate racial and economic impact.
For example, a 1972 study of the United States' contraceptive practices
revealed that 32.5% of all black women had been sterilized as opposed to
11.6% of all white women. 6 Another 1972 study noted that the combined
sterilization rate for Blacks and Latin Americans was almost two-thirds
higher than the rate for Caucasians. 7 The same study discovered that non-
white public assistance recipients were twice as likely "to elect" sterilization
than white recipients,8 and public assistance recipients, as a group, were
sterilized more than twice as often as non-recipients.9 Similar racial differ-
ences were detected in sterilization rates of married couples aged 15-44 in
the 1973 study.10 A 1976 study found that low income women of both races
aged 15-34 were sterilized more often than higher income women. 11
A 1976 government study also suggested that people of color may be fre-
quent targets of subtle "pressure." 12 This report states that in four out of
twelve Indian Health Service areas surveyed over 3,400 Native Americans
were sterilized during a four-year period.' 3 The Government Accounting
Office estimates that the number of persons actually sterilized was higher
5. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEW, 25 MONTHLY
VITAL STATISTICS REP. 3 (No. 7, Oct. 4, 1976) [hereinafter cited as MONTHLY VITAL STATIS-
TICS]. The study also found that 33.8% of couples in the 36-40 age group were sterilized. Id.
6. Westoff, The Modernization of U.S. Contraceptive Practice, 4 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTS.
9, 12 (No. 3, 1972).
7. The combined sterilization rate for Blacks and Latin Americans was 63% higher than
anglo-women. Vaughan & Sparer, Ethnic Group and Welfare Status of Women Sterilized in
Federally Funded Family Planning Programs, 1972, 6 FANI. PLAN. PERSPECTS. 224, 226 (No. 4,
1974).
8. Id. Among nonwhites, the aggregate sterilization rate for recipients was 19.7 per 1,000
as compared to 10.3 per 1,000 nonrecipients. Id. at 228.
9. Id. at 227. The sterilization rates were reviewed on the basis of welfare status without
consideration of age or parity.
10. See MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 3.
11. Ford, Contraceptual Use in United States 1973-1976, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTS. 264
(No. 5, 1978). In the 15-24 age group, sterilizations increased among white and black low income
married women from 5.3% in 1973 to an estimated 5.8% in 1976, while sterilizations decreased
among higher income women from 3.8% to 3.5%. In the 25-34 age group, sterilizations in-
creased by 10% in the low income group and 6.6% in the higher income group. In the 35-44
age group, however, low income sterilizations decreased and higher income sterlizations in-
creased, Id. at 265. These years are not the primary childbearing years.
12. Report to Senator Abourezk from Comptroller General of the United States, November
4, 1976 (HRD-77-3) [hereinafter cited as GAO Report].
13. Id.
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than reported. 14  Many so sterilized believed the procedure was mandatory,
not elective. 15
The belief that sterilization is mandatory 16 may be attributed to the ab-
sence of informed and voluntary consent. This type of manipulated consent
to sterilization is the heart of sterilization abuse.' 7  As both literature and
case law indicate, this abuse frequently takes place when women are ap-
proached for consent during labor,' 8  the postpartum period of
14. Indian Sterilizations Told, Chicago Sun Times, Nov. 1, 1976, at 2, col. 2 [hereinafter
cited as Indian Sterilizations]. The numbers are actually higher since the report only covered
four areas. Three thousand and one women of childbearing age (15-44 years) were sterilized.
Some were under 21 years of age. GAO Report, supra note 12, at 4. Dr. Uri estimates that
25% of native American women have been sterilized. Miller, Miller & Szychenyi, Native
American Peoples on the Trail of Tears Once More, AMERICA Dec. 9, 1978, 422, 423 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Native American Peoples].
15. Native American Peoples, supra note 14, at 422-23.
16. This experience has occurred not only with native American women, see note 15 and
accompanying text supra, but also with low income individuals in general. See note 24 and
accompanying text infra.
17. When a physician initiates the sterilization decision rather thah the woman, the regret
rate is reported to be 32%. Adams, Female Sterilization, 89 AM. J. OBSTETS. & GYN. 395, 401
(1964), citing Barnes & Zuspan, Patient Reaction to Puerperal Surgical Sterilization, 75 AM. J.
OBSTETS. & GYN. 65, 70 (1958). Diane Nuckles, a counselor at the Special Care Center in
Oakland, California, stated that in 1976 more than one out of every ten women who had been
counseled and signed the consent form changed their minds before surgery. Affidavit of Diane
Nuckles, Complaint in Intervention, Exhibit H at 1, California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No.
268099 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 28, 1978).
18. At Baltimore City Hospital, a study of 12 women between the ages of 18 and 21 re-
vealed that all 12 women were given sterilization consent forms to sign minutes before a caesar-
ean section operation. In almost all cases they were in active labor when approached and none
had expressed a prior interest in sterilization. B. Rosenfeld, S. Wolfe, R. McGarrah, A HEALTH
RESEARCH GROUP STUDY ON SURGICAL STERILIZATION: PRESENT ABUSES AND PROPOSED
REGULATIONS 4-5 (Oct. 29, 1973) (unpublished research by the Health Research Group, a
nonprofit public interest group in Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as HRG STUDY].
An interview with U.S.C.-L.A. Hospital house staff about their medical school hospitals re-
vealed that many women were pressured into sterilizations while under the stress and agony of
childbirth. Sometimes the residents suggested sterilization during labor by asking the women
whether they wanted to go through this pain again. Dreifus, Sterilizing the Poor, THE PRO-
GRESSIVE, Dec. 1975, at 13, 15-17 [hereinafter cited as Dreifus]. In one doctor's affidavit, he
stated:
I have . . . seen and documented continued pushing and hard selling of sterilization
at every public hospital with which I have been associated. Sterilization by coercion
was not an uncommon practice in these hospitals. Some of these practices consisted
of asking women in labor if they wanted their 'tubes tied', approaching women
immediately after childbirth ....
Affidavit of Dr. Rosenfeld, Complaint in Intervention, Exhibit E at 3, California Medical Ass'n
v. Lackner, No. 268099 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 28, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Rosenfeld's Af-
fidavit]. This type of abuse has been reported in the case law. See, e.g., Madrigal v. Quilligan,
No. CV 75-2057-JWC (D. Cal., filed June 30, 1978); Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196,
1199 (D.D.C. 1974).
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childbirth, 19 while sedated,2 0 or before or after an abortion. 21  Some women
also are offered an abortion in exchange for consenting to sterilization 12 or
are subjected to a hysterectomy for questionable reasons.2 3  Sometimes they
19. From July 1968 to July 1970, the Women's Hospital of Los Angeles County Medical
Center reported a 151% increase in tubal ligation sterilizations after delivery. See HRG STUDY,
supra note 18, at 1. Dr. Wood, the past president of the Association for Voluntary Sterilization
and a practicing obstetrician for thirty years, routinely offered postpartum sterilization to anv
indigent woman with three children. Psychosocial Aspects, supra note 3, at 307. See also
Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977).
20. One resident at U.S.C.-L.A. Hospital stated that he made his "pitch" while sewing up
the episiotomy when the anesthesia started wearing off. Fit To Be Tied, supra note 4, at 5.
21. Dr. Rosenfeld relates this eyewitness account of doctors:
[S]elling sterilization and abortion as a package deal, i.e., 'when we do your abor-
tion, it would be good to get your tubes tied at the same time' (at the time of an
abortion, a much fairer presentation of the options would be explaining that . . .
deciding during the stress of unwanted pregnancy in a short period of time may not
be ideal .... ).
Rosenfeld's Affidavit, supra note 18, at 3. Note that a vaginal tubal ligation performed in con-
junction with ans abortion has a 41.7% complication rate as compared to a 20.1% rate if the
abortion is not performed. Tappan, Kroener Tubal Ligation in Perspective, 115 Am. J. OBSTETS.
& GYN. 1053, 1054-55 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Tappan].
22. Nancy Stearns from the Center for Constitutional Rights reported cases of women being
offered abortions in exchange for sterlization. Arrastia, New Regulations for Sterilization,
2 SEVEN DAYS 3, 13-14 (No. 2, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Arrastia). Correspondence from Dr. D.
B. Whitehouse to the British Medical Journal reveals that sterilization of young wives are often
done in place of abortions. Dr. Whitehouse wrote that "[m]any of us ... with a dislike of
abortion, see tubal ligation as a simpler and mnore acceptable alternative, with the result that
the number of these operations performed has rocketed in the past few years." 2 BRITISH
MEDICAL JOURNAL 707 (June 19, 1971) (emphasis added). A former student from Wayne State
Medical School in Detroit explained that sixteen year olds were sterilized if they had two chil-
dren. He stated, however, that they did not perform many abortions since the residents did not
like to do them. Dreifus, supra note 18, at 16.
23. A hysterectomy is the removal of the uterus or "womb". This surgical procedure can be
approached from the vagina or the abdomen. Fit To Be Tied, supra note 4, at 2. The National
Center for Health Statistics estimated that 794,000 women underwent hysterectomies in 1976.
Caress, Womb-Boom, 77 HEALTH PAC. BULL. 13 (July/Aug. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Womb-
Boom]. Hysterectomy solely for the purpose of sterilization is now routinely practiced at many
hospitals. Id. at 14. It has a morbidity or complication rate of 22% and as many as 300-500
mortalities may occur per 100,000 hysterectomies. See Porter & Hulka, Female Sterilization in
Current Clinical Practice, 6 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTS. 30, 35 (No. 1, 1974). It is important to
note that hysterectomy is a "drastic sterilization procedure" which removes anl organ which has
considerable value for ego image and a woman's sense of identity. Id.
That hysterectomy often is performed for questionable medical reasons illustrates towards
whom it is directed and for what reasons. Two University of Kentucky doctors suggested that
vaginal hysterectomy might be the sterilization procedure of choice for the indigent, isultipar-
ous (multiple pregnancies) patient. Nagell & Roddick, Vaginal Hysterectomy as a Sterilization
Procedure, 111 AM. J. OBSTETS. & GYN. 703, 707 (1971). In response to these doctors' claims
that hysterectomy for socio-economic reasons during the ages of 20-39 was valuable to prevent
the high incidence of cancer associated with this population, the editor of Family Planning
Perspectives stated:
It may be pointed out, in case it did not occur to Drs. Van Nagell and Roddick.
that indigent populations are at significantly higher risk of developing a great nmany
ailments than more affluent populations, and that preventive surgery aimed at the
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are threatened with withdrawal of welfare assistance, 24 not told of alternative
birth control methods, 25 or are given misinformation. 26  Furthermore,
social conditions (poverty, malnutrition, poor medical care, slum housing, etc.)
which causes these inequities may be both more sensible and nore humane than
proposals to hack 'preventively' at future possibly offending flesh.
4 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTS. 1, 5 (No. 3, 1972).
An example of a hysterectomy done for a questionable reason is a hysterectomy performed for
training purposes. The Surgical Boards, including the American Board of Surgery and various
sub-specialty Boards (for example, Obstetrics and Gynecology), stipulate the number of opera-
tions the physician-candidate must assist or perform. This leads to the need to 'sell" these
operations. HRG STUDY, supra note 18, at 2. Often surgeons in training learn to operate by
performing surgery on low income individuals. Id. at 3. One resident stated "[i]f you call talk
her into it, get the papers and have her sign them .... If she won't agree to a hysterectoiv,
get me and I'll talk her into it." Id. A resident at Boston City Hospital is reported to have said
"[w]e like to do a hysterectomy, it's more of a challenge . . . You know, a well-trained chimpan-
zee can do a tubal ligation . . . and it's good experience for a junior resident . . . good training."
Id. Apparently, the health of the patient is not a factor. A hysterectomy (all types) has a 56. 1%
to 71.4% complication rate as compared to a 4.7% rate in laproscopic tubal ligation. Tappan,
supra note 21, at 1054-55. One physician notes that although hysterectomy is frowned upon as a
general sterilization procedure because of the significant risk and morbidity, "[r]ecent en-
thusiasm for performing sterilization by elective vaginal hysterectomy' and cesarean hvsterec-
tomy in the name of residency training is cornmonplace in some university hospitals with small
surgical census ... ." De Alvarez, Panel Discussion oni Contraception & Sterilization, 89 Am. J.
OBSTET. & GYN. 392, 394 (1964) [hereinafter cited as De Alvarez].
One controlled study found that tubal ligation has a better long term psychological response
than hysterectomy. The authors postulated that tubal ligation has a less drastic effect on bod'y
integrity and allows a fantasy of future pregnancies. This fantasy occurred almost uniformly in
those women sterilized by tubal ligation, but rarely in those sterilized by hvsterectomnv.
Barglow, Gunther, Johnson, & Meltzner, Hysterectomy and Tubal Ligation: A Psychiatric
Comparison, 25 OBSTETS. & GYN. 520, 525 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Barglow].
24. In Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974), the court noted that "an
indefinite number of poor people have been improperly coerced into accepting sterilization
operations under the threat that various federally supported welfare benefits would be with-
drawn unless they submitted to irreversible sterilization." Id. at 1199 (footnote omitted).
25. Adequate information about other birth control methods is an important factor in in-
formed consent. Knowledge of the risks and benefits of imethods other than sterilization enables
a person to Imake an informed decision about birth control.
26. A former medical student at University of California-San Francisco General Hospital
relates the following experience of onitting information: "[I]f the patient asked, yes, she'd Isic]
be told it was permanent. If there was a big rush, the staff wouldn't bother." Dreifus, supra
note 18, at 17. Another former inedical student from Bellevue Hospital in New York admitted
that man v women there believed their tubes could be untied. Id. Dr. Rosenfeld noted that
physicians rarely stressed that a tubal ligation actually involves removal or destruction of part of
the fallopian tube and therefore cannot later be "untied." Rosenfeld's Affidavit, supra note 18,
at 4. In one study, five out of twents, women admnitted to Baltimore City Hospital for tubal
ligation were told that the sterilization procedure was reversible or that there was no other
effective lmethod of birth control. When these five women were told that the procedure was
irreversible, they withdrew consent. HRG STUDY, supra note 18, at 6.
Dr. Rosenfield also reports a practice of exaggerating the dangers of a future pregnancy to the
point of distortion. Rosenfeld's Affidavit, supra note 18, at 3. Ms. Hernandez, an attorney,
reported that her mother was told after delivery that she would have to get her "tubes tied"
because if she had another baby, she would die. A second opinion revealed the falsity of this
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women often are not given sterilization information in their native lan-
guage 27 and, therefore, are asked to sign consent forms which they cannot
understand. In some cases, necessary medical services, 28 welfare benefits,
2 9
and, more recently, employment ° have been conditioned upon acceptance
of sterilization.
These practices reveal that many persons considering sterilization have no
access to all the information necessary to give fully informed consent to a
permanent and irreversible procedure. Sterilization abuse has a salient his-
tory indicating a disproportionate impact upon the poor and minorities.
Population Control
Sterilization without voluntary and informed consent began with the
eugenics movement early in the twentieth century.3 1  According to some
commentators, 32 the eugenics movement, which culminated in sterilization
claim. Dreifus, supra note 18, at 17. A former medical student admitted that "the ward patients
weren't [sic] given as much information on sterilization as the private patients." Id.
27. As a former medical student at New York's Bellevue Hospital described it: "There was a
large Puerto Rican population and I think a lot of women didn't know the full consequences of
what was happening to them. There was a language problem." Dreifus, supra note 18, at 17.
See also Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. CV 75-2057-JWC (1). Cal., filed June 30, 1978).
28. See Downs v. Sewtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (4th
Cir. 1977).
29. See Reif v. \Veinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974). See also Downs v.
Sawtelle, 574 F.2d I (lst Cir. 1978).
30. See Comment, Employmenit Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CALIF. L.
RE'. 1113 (1977).
3t. The objective of this movement was race improvement; its proponents applied Mendel's
law of heredity to humans. They believed that criminality, delinquency, inental illness,
epilepsy, imnmonrality, and pauperism were defective characteristics transmitted hereditarily. Sir
Francis Galton, the founder of this movement, coined the term "eugenics." He divided the
concept into two classes: (1) positive eugenics, directed at inducing those of superior stock to
marr others with similar qualities to produce children of superior quality, and (2) negative
eugenics, directed at suppressing reproduction by those who it was feared would pass on unde-
sirable characteristics to their offspring. Sterilization, segregation, and education were the pro-
posed means which would reduce reproduction. The advancement of salphingectomy (removal
of the fallopian tubes) and vasectomy (obstruction of the vas deferens) as surgical sterilization
procedures coincided with the interest in eugenics theory. See, e.g., Gaylord, The Sterilization
of Carrie Buck, 83 CASE & COMMENT 18, 19 (No. 5, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Gaylord].
As late as 1964, eugenic indications for population control were described as "curtailing re-
production in the feebleminded, insane, and those with major genetic disease. The end may be
techinicall' achieved by sterilization, or by institutional 'sterilization' b, the dentention of a
patient, particmuarily the female, until she has reached an age too ol to reproduce." )e Al-
varez, supra note 23, at 393 (emphasis added). As early as the 1940's, geneticists suggested that,
with some exceptions such as certain genetic diseases, such traits were not inheritable. Gaylord,
supra at 20,
32. Gaylord, sutpra note 31, at 19. See also LTTLE WOOD, supra note 1, at 113-15; Paul,
The Return of Puuitive Sterilization Proposals, 3 L. & Soc'N' REV. 77 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Paul I. 
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laws for the unfit,3 3 has spawned a new movement: population control.3 4
Population control is premised upon the theory that world problems, such as
inadequate food supplies, poverty and energy depletion, are a consequence
of overpopulation. 3 5 Government and society, therefore, have demonstrated
an interest in solving the world's problems by attempting to limit population
growth. 3 6 For example, the Federal Office of Population is seeking to pro-
33. It is not within the scope of this Comment to discuss eugenic sterilization and laws
relating thereto. These laws were designed to prevent America from being inundated by socially
undesirable classes or categories of persans that state legislators believed to be a threat to the
survival and stability, of the nation. Paul, supra note 32, at 78. See generally Ferster, Elininat-
ing the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIo S.C.J. 591 (1966); Murdock, Sterilization of
the Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 917 (1974); Neuwirth, Capacity,
Competence, Consent; Voluntary Sterilization of the Mentally Retarded, 6 COLUNI. HUMAN
RIGHTS L. REV. 447 (1974). The infamous Supreme Court decision of Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200 (1927), upheld the validity of the Virginia Sterilization Act, which was patterned after a
nationally proposed model Eugenical Sterilization Act.
34. One author offered the following connection between the eugenics movement and the
present population control movement:
Recently, there has been a renewal of interest in compulsory sterilization; not for
eugenic purposes but as a population control measure. . . (Malthus proposed cutting
off doles to poor families and 'letting the laws of nature, which are the laws of God'
resolve the overpopulation for the poor.) (citation omitted).
. . . Within the past two decades, a number of measures contributory to popula-
tion control . . . have been tried. . . . And there are even proposals to limit the size
of welfare benefits regardless of family size, adopting Malthus' proposed remedy of
making Poor Laws stricter,
Gaylord, supra note 32, at 20. See also LITTLENVOOD, supra note 1, at 114.
35. See Shaw, Procreation and the Population Problem, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1165 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Shaw]. LITTLEWOOD, supra note 1, at 6, describes various attitudes of
society toward "overpopulation" by the poor. The first is the "Equal Opportunity Concept" in
which Americans who can afford to pay their own medical bills generally have the capacity to
regulate their family size, but the poor are unable to control family size and suffer untold
undesirable consequences. Littlewood notes that historically, this "hard core of support" for
organized birth control had been bolstered in the United States by the very rich who feared
that the system would be threatened by lower class overpopulation. Id. The second attitude he
describes is "Quality-of-Life." It is espoused by those who are "comfortably fixed" and worried
about metropolitan overcrowding and environmental pollution. A few, he notes, are sincerely
sickened by the world population-hunger problem, and want the U.S. to set a good example for
the rest of the world even though this is a "food-exporting nation with serious overpopulation
only in a few metropolitan centers." Id. at 7. The third attitude belongs to the "eugenic en-
gineers" who believe that "undesirables-blacks particularily-are propagating wildly, that they
won't support themselves out of sheer laziness, and that this expanding 'underclass' is deter-
joined to transfer wealth from productive workers to parasitic loafers." Id.
36. See Psychological Aspects, supra note 3, at 304; Shaw, supra note 35, at 1167. The
government's interest in limiting population growth became policy in 1970 when the Public
Health Service Act was amended by Title X of Population Research and Voluntary Family Plan-
ning Act Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (1970). This amendment authorized governmen-
tal grants for contracts with public or private entities to "assist in developing and making avail-
able family planning and population growth information." Id. at § 300a(3). Such a grant or
contract for a family planning project could be made only upon assurances that priority would be
given in the project to furnishing these services to low income families at no charge. Id. at
§§ 300a-4(c)(1), (2).
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vide the means by which one quarter of the fertile women in the world can
be sterilized.3 7  The director of this office has cited several reasons why the
United States should assume leadership in world population control, includ-
ing the notion that such control will increase the standard of living in under-
developed countries.3 8  He also has stated that population control is neces-
sary to maintain the "normal operation of U.S. commercial interests around
the world." 3 9
The theory that the eugenics movement has progressed into an economi-
cally motivated population control movement is evidenced by their parallel
philosophies and by the similarity of the proposed sterilization laws
to those adopted at the height of the eugenics movement. For example,
there have been various state legislative proposals to sterilize mothers of
illegitimate children who receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC).4 0 Another illustration of the close connection between these
A more explicit example of governmental attempts to decrease population in order to solve
"population problems" is described in an introduction to an HEW publication:
While the emphasis on voluntary family planning as a health measure of consider-
able significance for both the individual family and the community is readily ac-
cepted, the interest of public welfare departments has also focused attention on the
added dimension of family planning as a social measure, since the availability of
family planning services is a crucial part of community efforts to reduce poverty
and dependency ...
The support of the U.S. Federal and State governments for family planning and
contraception served as a powerful impetus to the proliferation of important new
programs in the mid-1960's ...
The passage of [the Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of
1970] and the influx of Federal Funds led to the rapid increase in number of new
family planning programs.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEW, DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NATIONAL INVENTORY OF FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES 2-3 (Pub. No. 76-1312 Series 1, No. 12,
January 1976) (emphasis added). See also Note, Involuntary Sterilization: An Unconstitutional
Menace to Minorities and the Poor, 4 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 127 (1974).
Birth rate records reveal that attempts to limit population have been successful. In 1972,
there was a significant drop in the birth rate, and in 1974 a record low was reached.
LITTLEWOOD, supra note 1, at 65-66.
37. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 22, 1977, at 1, col. 1 (emphasis added).
38. Id.
39. Id. After revealing the government's economic motives, he noted that "without our try-
ing to help these countries with their economic and social development, the world would rebel
against the strong U.S. commercial presence. The self-interest thing is a compelling element."
id.
40. Paul, supra note 32, at 78. The states considering such punitive sterilization proposals
were California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and Virginia. Id. at 79. State Representative David H. Glass of Tosciusko, Mississippi,
sponsor of the legislation in that state, stated that "the Negro woman, because of child welfare
assistance is making it a business, in some cases of giving birth to illegitimate children ....
The purpose of my bill was to try to stop, or slow down such traffic at its source." Id. at 89
(emphasis added). Richard Friske, a Michigan state legislator, probably reflected the views of
many of his colleagues when he stated that "there is a need for curbing the growth of the drone
population that weakens our society. Educated, propertied Americans need a vigorous pro-
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movements is the notion that the "welfare dilemma" means taxpayers' rights
are ignored without any obligation imposed upon welfare recipients to stop
increasing the public burden by indulging in hVperfertility.
4 1
A proposed solution to "clearing up the welfare mess" 42 is to decrease the
poor population by routinely offering postpartum sterilization to all pregnant
women falling within lower socioeconomic groups. 43 The population explo-
sion rationale, most often directed at the poor, blames the victim of society's
ills for society's ills.4 4 Herein lies the threat of sterilization abuse: the popu-
natalist outlook, but the tax pressure of the middle-class all but forbids this ... while the
ignorant dependent elements multiply." LITTLEWOOD, supra note 1, at 81-82 (emphasis added).
Of all these states, Maryland introduced the strongest proposal to curb illegitimacy. Maryland
Senate Bill No. 91 would have subjected a woman "convicted" of giving birth to more than two
illegitimate children to a fine of one thousand dollars and/or imprisonment not to exceed three
months. Paul, supra note 32, at 84. In addition, she could be declared morally unfit. The state
could then permanently remove her children from her care and control, and permanently bar
her from receiving welfare payments. There was also a provision that called for mandatory
sterilization. Perhaps the most freightening aspect of this proposed bill was that it passed in
the Maryland Senate by a vote of 23 to 3. Fortunately, it was defeated in the House of Dele-
gates. Id. at 84-85.
House Bill No. 180, introduced into the Mississippi legislature in 1964 by Representative
W.B. Meek, made being a parent of a second or subsequent illegitimate child a felony punish-
able by one to three years in the state penitentiary. Representative McCullough added an
amendment which would have allowed a convicted parent to submit to sterilization in lieu of
imprisonment. Id. at 89-90. Perhaps most indicative of the overlapping between the eugenics
and population control movements was a bill introduced in North Carolina that extended the
existing eugenics sterilization law to include grossly sexually delinquent persons. Giving birth to
a second or subsequent illegitimate child was grounds for a hearing before the State Eugenics
Board, which could order sterilization. Upon birth of a third illegitimate child, the Eugenics
Board was mandated to order the mother to show cause why she should not be found a grossly
sexual delinquent and sterilized. Id. Thus, it indeed does appear that sterilization continued to
have symbolic force in the minds of some for saving America from shame and poverty as it did
sixty years earlier when legislators were saving America from mental deficients.
While earlier arguments differed from the present revival in their stress on biological, rather
than economic determinism, both rely on a notion of fitness as a prerequisite for procreation.
"Whereas the earlier eugenic efforts were aimed at cutting off the 'defective germ plasm' of the
American people before it 'drowned' us, current efforts would be aimed at cutting off both the
defective germ plasm and welfare payments in order to avoid strangulation." Id. at 101. At least
some would like to cut off the ability to reproduce to achieve both results. Paul quite accurately
predicted that compulsory sterilization would be replaced with consent procedures and in-
creased state and federal efforts to institute cash programs in birth control information and
services. Id. at 102. As was noted in Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974),
"[tihe dividing line between family planning and eugenics is murky .... the secretary, through
• . . regulations . . . seeks to sanction one of the most drastic methods of population control -
the involuntarv irreversible sterilization of men and women." Id. at 1204.
41. Psychosocial Aspects, supra note 3, at 306.
42. Fit To Be Tied, supra note 4, at 11.
43. Psychosocial Aspects, supra note 3, at 307. Sterilization would put an end to the
"frightening increase in crime which may be the result of irresponsible and involuntary parent-
hood compounded by neglect and rejection of the child." id.
44. The following view of Dr. Curtis Wood, the past president of the Association for Volun-
tary Sterilization, an organization active in the population control movement, is an example of
this type of rationale:
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:731
lation control philosophy promotes the elimination of the lower economic
class and minorities, the "unfit" of our society. 45  This danger was recog-
nized as early as 1942 by Justice Douglas who described sterilization as the
power which "[ijn evil or reckless hands ... can cause races or types which
are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear." 46  It is sub-
mitted that regulation of informed consent to sterilization is necessary to
affirmatively protect against involuntary sterilization. Such practices are not
People pollute and too 1oany people crowded too close together cause many of our
social and economic problems. These, in turn, are aggravated by involuntary and
irresponsible parenthood. As physicians we .. .also have an obligation to the soci-
ety of which we are a part. The welfare mess, as it has been called, cries out for
solutions, one of which is fertility control.
Fit To Be Tied, supra note 4, at 11.
It is significant that Dr. Curtis sees the physician's responsibility to society as an obligation to
solve the welfare mess by fertility control. The implications of a population control policy aimed
at the poor are tremendous, particularly when concurrent and tangible efforts to increase their
life chances are absent. The National Medical Association, an organization of black physicians,
was suspicious of family planning prograns for this reason. They preferred a comprehensive
health care program with family planning as only one part of the package. LiTTLEWOO), supra
note 1, at 118. See also note 9 supra.
45. Littlewood believed that:
Behind all the fashionable rhetoric about ecological purity, backyard gardens, free-
don of opportunity, maternal health, and long lines at movie houses stood the
unpleasant political sociology of class and race. The policies of the 1960s and 1970s
were aimed at lowering the fertility of the poor and the uneducated-particularily
of Blacks and Latin Americans. If the objective is to check population growth as
such, then the sensible policy would be to start with 'that segment of the population
which already possesses motivation and technical competence in fertility control.'
LiTTLEWOOD, supra note 1, at 66-67, quoting H. Yuan Tien, sociologist at Ohio State Univer-
sity. Littlewood also quoted a religious leader's belief that "[o]ur Catholic leadership has been
wooed, unsuccessfully thank God, on many levels with the promise that 'we will leave your
people alone. The proliferating Negro is our target.' " LITTLEWOOD, supra note 1, at 77, quot-
ing Monsignor Rice.
This is not to say that middle class women are not subjected to sterilization abuse. This
abuse, however, may take a more subtle form, as when a man is seeking a vasectomy and he is
told that his wife should be sterilized instead. For example, in 1976 Dr. Curtis Wood advocated
that physicians perform sterilizations on women rather than men for the following reasons:
First, because it is the woman who endures most of the mental and physical bur-
dens of producing and rearing the child while the man is out trying to make a living
. ..Second, women still menstruate . ..and are much less apt to have undesirable
psychological side effects from the procedure than are men ...
The final and by far most important reason is. . . . [w]hen a marriage breaks tIp,
the court usually awards the children to the wife. If she remarries she tends to
marry an older man, a widower, or divorcee, who has probably experienced the
joys and sorrows of fatherhood and does not wish to begin all over again with a new
crop of babies when he has his new wife's children to care for. The husband, on the
other hand, tends to marry a younger woman who has not been married before and
wants her husband to have a reversal so she can become a mother.
Psychological Aspects, supra note 3, at 305-06 (emphasis added).
46. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (Douglas, J., writing for an unanimous
Supreme Court).
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only abusive, but may result in the inability to exercise a constitutional
right-the right to procreate without governmental interference. 47
Constitutionality of Regulations
Preventing Sterilization Abuse
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,48 the United States Supreme Court held that
procreation is fundamental among the basic civil rights. 49  The Court found
that a criminal statute which mandated sterilization of habitual felons en-
croached upon this right,50 since it operated as an invidious discrimination in
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 ' In
recognizing that procreation is fundamental to "the very existence and survi-
val of the race," the Court characterized sterilization as an "irreparable in-
jury" and a "permanent deprivation of liberty."52
47. Id. The following argument assumes that the requisite state action is present. See, e.g.,
Reitman v. Mulkev, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (prestige or authority of state encourages or supports
private action which violated constitutional rights); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961) (the state is significantly involved in the injury as a joint partner); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (although a racially restrictive covenant is private action, it is en-
forced by the state through its courts).
48. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
49. Id. at 541.
50. Id. at 536. The statute defined a habitual criminal as one who has been convicted of a
felony involving moral turpitude twice in the courts of Oklahoma or in the courts of another
state and thereafter convicted of such a felony and sentenced to prison. Id. The defendant had
previously been convicted of stealing chickens and robbery with firearms, and was ordered to
submit to sterilization after another conviction for stealing chickens. Id. at 537. The Supreme
Court reasoned that the nature of larceny and embezzlement were intrinsically the same and
the promotion of sterilization for one but not the other was not constitutionally justifiable. Id. at
539. Thus, discrimination, not sterilization, in the statute's classification scheme was held to be
unconstitutional. The Skinner Court relied on Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), in reaching its
decision on equal protection grounds. 316 U.S. 535, 539-42. In Buck, the Supreme Court up-
held a compulsory sterilization ordered under an eugenic statute. Justice Holmes wrote:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, to let them starve off for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that compulsory vaccina-
tion is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall stated: "Skinner does
not impune the continuing validity of Buck v. Bell .. " San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 100 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For an excellent discussion
of this see Brown, Book Review, 24 EMORY L.J. 1037, 1055-61 (1975) (CASE HISTORIES, INTEREST
GROUP LITIGATION AND MR. JUSTICE HOLMES: SOME UNEXPLORED QUESTIONS ON PSYCHO-
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR).
51. The Court noted that the statute exempted those persons convicted of embezzlement
from its operation even though, according to the laws of Oklahoma, the crime of embezzlement
was intrinsically the same in quality as the crime of larceny. Consequently, the statute imposed
unequal treatment on criminals whose crimes were essentially equivalent. Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S, 535, 539 (1942).
52. Id. at 541.
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Recent Supreme Court decisions have also sought to protect the right to
procreate. The right to be free from governmental intrusion in the child-
bearing decision-making process was recognized in Roe v. Wade, 53 where
the Court held that the fundamental right to privacy encompassed the deci-
sion to seek an abortion. Eisenstadt v. Baird 54 also held that the right to
privacy included the right of an individual to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion in so fundamental a decision as whether to "bear or
beget a child."5'
Given the extent and nature of sterilization abuse, 56 including its en-
croachment upon this right to procreate, the state has a compelling interest
in enacting regulations preventing such abuses. Thus, regulations mandating
informed consent to sterilization would not constitute an "unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion" in violation of the fundamental right to privacy. 5 7  Un-
like outlawing abortion, regulating sterilization is not a governmental intru-
sion because it does not force a woman to bear or not bear a child. 58 This
regulation would only ensure that the decision whether or not to procreate is
made with informed and voluntary consent. Thus, such a state law would
provide what is clearly necessary protection and should be found constitu-
tional. 59
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Although the right to privacy is not specified in the constitution, it
is recognized as a fundamental right which emanates from various constitutional provisions.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Supreme Court explained that
the right to privacy is a peripheral right emanating from several specific amendments contained
in the Bill of Rights. Id. at 482-83. A long line of cases establish the right to privacy: Roe v.
Wade 410 U.S. 118 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(procreation).
54. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Eisenstadt Court held that a law which discriminated against
two classes of persons, those married and those unmarried, violated the fundamental interest in
privacy under the equal protection clause.
55. Id. at 453.
56. Moreover, sterilization abuse has occurred with the use of federal funds. See Relf v.
Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974).
57. This challenge would probably be made in the context of interference with the doctor-
patient relationship.
58. Unlike abortion, which is the only means of preventing birth after conception, steriliza-
tion is one of many ways of preventing pregnancy before conception. Therefore, sterilization
regulations do not infringe upon the privacy rights recognized by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 118
(1973).
59. It should be noted, however, that several suits have been brought against hospitals
establishing a "right" to sterilization without unnecessary restrictions. Hathaway v. Worcester
City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973); McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Center, 453 F.2d
698 (2d Cir. 1971). These hospitals restricted access to sterilization relying on the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) restrictions. Note, however, that ACOG.
dropped its recommendations restricting access to sterilization in 1969. These restrictions in-
cluded the age-parity formula. That formula allowed sterilization of women only if their number
of children multiplied by their age equaled one hundred and twenty. In addition two doctors'
signatures plus a psychiatric consultation were required before sterilization. Fit To Be Tied,
supra note 4, at 4. Thus, these restrictions had nothing to do with health or informed consent.
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THE NEED FOR STATE REGULATION
The need for state regulation consistent with, but stricter than, existing
federal legislation 60 is evidenced by the lack of compliance with federal
rules.6 1 Moreover, the federal mandates only apply to federally funded
sterilizations while state regulation could apply to all sterilizations. Further-
more, individual malpractice actions are an inefficient means to prevent
sterilization abuse since these necessarily are brought after sterilization.
Surely no damage award could adequately compensate for the loss of the
ability to procreate. Additionally, it is possible that such loss may not be
compensated since courts sometimes inconsistently interpret the rights and
remedies involved.6 2 These criticisms, directed toward the need for state
legislation, will be discussed in the following two sections.
Regulating Federally Funded Sterilization
Relf v. Weinberger
The existence of federally finded involuntary sterilization was recognized
in Ref v. Weinberger 3 which involved a class action challenge to the then
existing Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) sterilization
guidelines. The district court held that the regulations were arbitrary and
unreasonable because they failed to implement the Congressional command
that participation in federally funded family planning services be voln-
Many legal writers advocate free access to sterilization and refute the need for regulations.
See Kindregan State Power Over Human Fertility and Individual Liberty, 23 HASTINGS L.J.
1401 (1972); Pipel, Voluntary Sterilization; A Human Right, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV.
105 (1975); Shaw, supra note 35; Torbes, Voluntary Sterilization of Women as a Right, 18
DEPAUL L. REV. 560 (1969). These writers challenged the age-parity formula as interfering with
the fundamental right to decide whether to bear or beget a child. The age-parity formula did
interfere with this right. When sterilization abuse, however, is accomplished with federal funds,
it constitutionally interferes with the right to procreate and consequently a balance is needed.
Regulating informed consent is that balance. See notes 64-68 and accompanying text infra for a
discussion of Relf v. Weinberger. See also note 63 infra. The statute in the states authorizing
sterilizations do not regulate them. Most were enacted to clarify legal uncertainties regarding
voluntary contraceptive sterilization by pronouncing it not contrary to public policy. Comment,
The Doctor, The Patient and The United States Constitution, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 327, 339
(1973). Hathaway v. Worchester City Hospital, 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973), and its progeny
established the right to sterilization and eliminated the age-parity requirements. Hathaway held
that the hospital's "unique ban" on sterilization violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment because no other surgical procedure was banned. Id. at 706. The court also
found that non-therapeutic procedures of equal risk were performed and thus, the hospital
could not refuse to perform sterilizations on these grounds as such refusal interfered with a
fundamental right. Id. An argument can be made that this case should not apply to the regula-
tion of sterilization since the regulations curb violations of the fundamental right to procreate;
they do not interfere with it. The regulations ensure informed decisions whether or not to bear
or beget a child.
60. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,148 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.202).
61. See notes 82-92 and accompanying text infra.
62. See notes 95-118 and accompanying text infra.
63. 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974).
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tar'. 64  The court found "uncontroverted evidence" that an indefinite
number of people receiving federal assistance were coerced into sterilizations
under the threat of welfare assistance withdrawal. 65
As the court in Reif noted, even a fully informed person cannot make a
"voluntary" decision about sterilization if he or she is subjected to coercion
from doctors or project officers. 66  The Relf court defined "voluntary" to
mean that an individual has the information necessary to make a rational
decision regarding sterilization. 67 Thus, as a result of the Relf decision,
federally assisted family planning sterilizations are permissible only with the
voluntary, knowing, and uncoerced consent of a competent person. 68
64, Id. at 1201. Although the court did not decide the case on constitutional grounds, it
stated that involuntarv sterilizations directlv threatened the constitutional right to privacy. Id. at
1201, citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Statutory authority for federal funding of family planning services, including sterilization, is
given to HEW in various titles of the Social Security Act which are codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§60 2 (a)(15), 705(a)(8), 1396a (a)(13), 1396d(a)(4)(c), 1397a(a)l (1976). Additional Congressional
authorization is conferred in the Public Health Service Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d (a),
(b), (c); 254c(b), (1), (c); 300(a) (1976).
Three subdivisions of HEW are responsible for administering programs which involve the
funding of sterilization. These are the Medicaid Bureau of the Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration (HFSA), the Administration for Public Services (APS) of the Office of Human Develop-
ment, and the Public Health Service (PHS). While the requirements for qualification of federal
funds are the same for programs under the Social Security Act and the Public Health Service
Act, the regulatory mechanism differs according to which subdivision administers the funding.
IICFA and APS condition federal reimbursement to state agencies upon compliance by the
health care provider with the federal guidelines. PHS funds certain programs such as Indian
health centers and community health centers directly. It regulates by making the requirements
a condition precedent to the grant of funds. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,148 (1978) (to be codified in 42
C. F.R. § 50.202).
65. Relfv. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974). Moreover, the court noted
that patients receiving medical assistance at childbirth had been the most frequent targets of
this type of pressure. Indeed, one of the plaintiffs was refused medical assistance by her physi-
cian unless she consented to be sterilized after childbirth. Id.
66. Id. at 1203. There have been legislative attempts to validate this type of coercion. In
1972, bills introduced in five state legislatures offered cash incentives for sterilization to welfare
recipients or denied welfare payments to unsterilized women with one or two illegitimate chil-
dren. The Illinois and New Hampshire proposals offered cash incentives, while Indiana, Ohio,
and Tennessee would have denied benefits. None of the bills passed. Eliot, Fertility Control
and Coercion, 5 FAINs. PLAN. PERSPEc'rs. 132 (No. 5, 1973).
At least some members of the medical profession support the legislature in its attempt to
encourage welfare recipients into the "election" of sterilization. Planned Parenthood did a pilot
survey of 226 physicians in Detroit, Grand Rapids, Memphis, and West Virginia. The results
showed 34% 6mivred withholding public assistance for any illegitimate children after the second
child and 30% lavored total withdrawal of welfare benefits if the mother refused sterilization.
Silver, Birth Control and the Private Physician, 4 FA. PLAN. PERSPECTS. 42, 44 (No. 2, 1972).
Moreover, many doctors "encourage" sterilization for low-income and welfare mothers be-
cause they believe that the poorer the woman, the less likely she is to use other methods
successfully. Physiciani Attitudes: AIDs Assume Poor Can't Remember to Take Pill, 1 FAM.
PLAN. Dic. 3-4 (Jan. 1972). One physician-participant in a panel discussion noted that the area
of population control was a "realin of responsibility for all gynecologists". See De Alvarez, note
23 supra.
67. Relf v. \Veinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (D.D.C. 1974).
68. I. at 12(11.
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To ensure such consent, the court ordered HEW to promulgate new regu-
lations requiring that sterilization decisions be voluntary. 69  Pursuant to this
order, HEW released regulations in 1974 which mandated informed consent
in sterilization decisions. 70  Due to criticisms 71 and studies which indicated
a lack of compliance with the 1974 regulations, 72 HEW proposed new
sterilization rules in 1977 73 which were adopted in 1978. 74  These rules
require a "thorough" explanation of the specific procedure to be performed,
including the attendant risks and benefits and a description of alternative
birth control methods. 75  In addition, notice must be given that the sterili-
zation decision will not affect any federal benefits. 76  A thirty day waiting
period also is imposed between consent and operation, 77 and solicitation of
consent during childbirth or abortion is prohibited. 78
These new rules, however, do not rectify several significant problems. For
example, although HEW includes abortion in its description of alternative
birth control methods, 79 it refuses to fund abortions.8 0  Consequently, this
69. Id. at 1205. HEW was ordered to advise persons at "the outset and prior to solicitation"
of consent that the decision not to be sterilized would not affect federal benefits. Id. at 1204-05.
70. 42 C.F.R. § 50.201-04 (1974). These provisions included a "fair explanation" of the pro-
cedure, the risks and benefits, and a description of alternative birth control methods. Comply-
ing with the court's mandate, HEW required that notice be given that the sterilization decision
would not affect any federal benefits. A three day waiting period was imposed between consent
and operation, as well as documentation of that consent. Id. at §§ 50.20 2 -.203c.
71. Arrastia, New Regulations for Sterilization, SEVEN DAYS, Feb. 24, 1978, at 13; Evanoff,
Sterilization Guidelines, 80 HEALTH PAC. BULL. 19 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Evanoff]; Com-
ment, Contraceptive Sterilization: The Need for State Regulation, 6 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 79
(1978); Comment, Coerced Sterilization Under Federally Funded Family Planning Programs,
1976 UTAH L. REV. 589.
72. REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
HOSPITAL SURVEY ON STEMLIZATION POLICIES 21 (March 1975) [hereinafter cited as ACLU
STUDY]. See also HRG STUDY, supra note 18, at 4-5.
73. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,718 (1977).
74. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,146 (1978).
75. Id. at 52,157 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.204 (2), (4), (5)).
76. Id. (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.204(a)(1)).
77. Id. at 52,150 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.203). Subsection (d) contains two excep-
tions where consent may be obtained earlier: emergency abdominal surgery (72 hours must pass
between consent and surgery) and premature delivery (consent may be given at delivery as long
as informed consent was given 30 days before the expected delivery date). The regulations also
mandate that the person be informed that sterilization is considered irreversible. Id. at 52,157
(to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.204(3)).
78. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,157 (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.204(e)(1)(ii)).
79. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,168 (1978). It is included in the pamphlet appended to the consent
form which is not required to be given to the individual. Information about alternative methods
of birth control, as well as other information, must be given orally. There is no requirement that
the information be in writing.
80. 39 Fed. Reg. 42,920 (1974). Recently, HEW amended its regulations to provide for
federal financial participation in state funding of abortions in limited cases. 43 Fed. Reg. 3,168
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alternative is effectively foreclosed to indigent women who then may feel
compelled to submit to sterilization. In contrast, HEW reimburses the states
for ninety percent of the cost of sterilization because this procedure, unlike
abortion, is considered a family planning service. 8'
Several critics point out that this refusal to require states to fund abortions
presents a real danger that medicaid patients will be subjected to increased
pressure to undergo sterilization. 82  Others report that abortions are being
offered in exchange for submitting to sterilization. 83  Some critics further
maintain that HEW's practice of funding sterilization, an effective but ir-
reversible procedure, and excluding the funding of abortions, a back up serv-
ice to less effective but reversible birth control, is coercive in and of it-
self. 84
The most significant criticism left unanswered by the new regulations is
the lack of a strong enforcement provision. 85  The signed consent form con-
tinues to be the sole enforcement mechanism, 8 6 and although an unsigned
form is tantamount to noncompliance with the regulations, it only results in
denial of government funding for that particular procedure. 87 No sanctions
are imposed upon the provider for failure to comply with the regulations. 88
(1978). In the following situations state funded abortions are allowed: where the life of the
mother would be endangered by pregnancy, 42 C.F.R. § 50.304; where the pregnancy would
cause severe and long lasting damage to the mother's physical health, 42 C.F.B. § 50.305; and
where pregnancy is caused by rape or incest, 42 C.F.R. § 50.306.
81. 39 Fed. Beg. 42,920 (1974). The restrictions on federally funded abortions likewise re-
strict the practical effect of alternative birth control methods. A woman knows that if she uses a
less effective but reversible method and that method fails, she cannot obtain an abortion with
federal funds.
82. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 72.
83. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
84. See Arrastia, supra note 22; Evanoff, supra note 71.
85. Federal financial assistance administered by the Public Health Service (PHS) is not
available for sterilization procedures unless the consent form appended to the regulations or one
approved by HEW is used. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,165 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R.
§ 50.209(a)). Documentation includes consent forms and acknowledgement of receipt of hysterec-
tomy information. Id. (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.209(b)). Individual provider reimburse-
ment for sterilization requires compliance with the provisions of 42 C.F.R. § 50.204.
86. Compare 39 Fed. Reg. 4,734(6)(c) (1974) with 43 Fed. Reg. 52,167 (1978). Thus, "en-
forcement" means a denial of federal reimbursement for the cost of the procedure. Under
HEW's "enforcement", the provider could forego compliance and simply not be paid. A teach-
ing hospital might be willing to "pick up the tab" so that residents could get surgical training.
See note 23 supra.
87. The only monitoring and enforcement provided by the regulations are the requirement
that the program or project maintain "sufficient records arnd documentation" to assure com-
pliance. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,167 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. 50,210). HEW intends to
monitor and enforce compliance with the regulations "to the best of its ability." 43 Fed. Reg.
52,164 (1978). The present monitoring efforts of APS, HCFA, and PHS will continue and will
be supplemented by a program of monitoring by the Inspector General. Id.
88. The new regulations do not change the previous enforcement mechanisms. Thus, if the
consent form is filled in and signed according to the regulations, there is compliance with the
rules and the provider is reimbursed. Noncompliance results in rejection of the claim for pay-
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Thus, as indicated in a 1.975 study, this minimal enforcement mechanism has
little, if any, impact on compliance with sterilization regulations.8 9 For
example, from a total of fifty-one hospitals responding to a survey, thirty-six
were in complete noncompliance with the regulations. 90 Even after HEW
resurveyed and confirmed these results, however, it failed to take any
enforcement action. 91 A more recent stud), also evidenced this lack of im-
pact.92 It found that as of 1977, many hospitals still were not complying
with the 1974 regulations. 93
Although the adopted regulations do bring some needed changes, their
effect is limited because of the lack of a strong enforcement provision. 94
ment. For example, as late as 1977, Illinois providers were submitting bills for procedures that
did not meet the federal requirements of 1974. Variant forms resulted in rejection of the bill. 2
MEDICAID MESSAGE 2 (Feb. 1977). Thus, nonpayment does little to ensure compliance with
federal regulations. The imposition of sanctions would provide greater incentive.
89. See ACLU STUDY, supra note 72. Of the 154 hospitals surveyed, two-thirds failed to
respond. Id. at 5.
90. id. at 20. Still another twelve failed to be in complete compliance. Id. at 21.
91. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FAMILY PLANNING EVALUATION DIVISION, AN As-
SESSMENT OF POLICY COMPLIANCE VITH FEDERAL CONTROL OF STERILIZATION (1975), cited
in Statement of Pamela Horowitz, Legislative Counsel, ACLU, on Proposed Restrictions Appli-
cable to Sterilizations Funded by the Department of HEW (Jan. 17, 1978) (Attachnment A).
Another example of failure to take enforcement action is the 1975 Sterilization Review of the
Illinois Department of Public Aid by HEW. Although the 72-hour waiting period was not met
and the consent form lacked vital information (such as the notice requirements as to federal
benefits and whether the patient was informed of the irreversibility of sterilization), payment
was allowed. Report from HEW on Illinois (April 21, 1975) (obtained pursuant to FOIA re-
quest).
92. Letter from Nancy Stearns, Staff Attorney of the Center for Constitutional Rights, to
Joseph A. Califano (Dec. 27, 1977) (Reprint of survey available from CCR, 853 Broadway, New
York, N.Y. 10003) [hereinafter cited as Stearns].
93. In 33% of the teaching hospitals responding, the hospitals were obtaining consent during
labor and 58% were doing likewise at the time of admission for an abortion. Id. at 4. An
additional 30% did not indicate on the consent form that the sterilization decision could not
affect federal benefits. Stearns, supra note 92, at 3.
A survey of Chicago-Cook County area hospitals conducted in October, 1978, also found that
22 out of 32 hospitals were in non-compliance with the 1974 HEW regulations. M. Keefe & M.
Kelly, Legal Assistance Foundation Sponsored Survey of Chicago Hospitals (unpublished study
available, 343 S. Dearborn, Chicago, Illinois 60604). From January through June of 1978, 2,261
women in Illinois receiving medical assistance were sterilized, and 66.5% of these operations
took place in Cook County. Letter from S. Miller, Administrator of the Illinois Medical Assis-
tance Program, to Ms. Hatchett & Ms. Goodman (Aug. 30, 1978). A total of 14,989 Illinois
women receiving such assistance were sterilized from July of 1975 to January of 1978. HEW,
Monthly Statistical Report on Medical Care Part IV, National Center for Social Statistics [here-
inafter cited as HEW Report]. One hundred and ten of these sterilizations were performed on
women less than 21 years of age, violating the moratorium imposed by the Secretary of HEW
on July 27, 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,930 (1973). This moratorium remained in effect until the 1978
regulations were adopted. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,718, 62,719 (1977). Ten of the Illinois sterilizations
were on girls under 18 years of age, in direct violation of the 1974 regulations. 39 Fed. Reg.
4732 (1974).
94. Noncompliance with the federal regulations merely results in nonpayment from HEW
for the procedure. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,163 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.209(b)). See
notes 23 and 86 supra.
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Moreover, these guidelines only apply to federally funded sterilizations.
Therefore, state regulations are necessary to ensure that all sterilization deci-
sions are both informed and voluntary.
Judicial Response to Sterilization Abuse
Not only are the federal regulations inadequate, but civil rights actions
also have proven to be unsuccessful in redressing the wrong perpetrated by
sterilization abuse. Walker v. Pierce 95 amply illustrates the difficulties en-
countered in such actions. Two black women receiving medical assistance 96
under the medicaid program sued an obstetrician in Walker 97 for sterilizing
them or threatening to do so solely on account of their race and number of
children. 98 One plaintiff refused sterilization after delivery of her third
child. Upon notice of her refusal, the doctor ordered her discharge from the
hospital. 99 The other plaintiff, while pregnant with her fourth child, was
threatened by the doctor with termination of welfare assistance and medical
care if she did not consent to sterilization.100
In discussing Walker, one commentator stated that the three physicians
practicing in that county agreed among themselves that maternity services
should be provided to a mother of a third illegitimate child only upon the
mother's consent to sterilization. °1 Dr. Pierce, the doctor involved in
Walker, was the only obstetrician in the county. 10 2 The court of appeals 103
training. See note 23 supra.
95. 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977). This civil rights action was brought under 28 U.S.C. §
1983.
96. The Medicaid program provides federal financial participation in the state's public assis-
tance of Medicare.
97. Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609, 610 (4th Cir. 1977). The other defendants were the
chairperson and the administrator of the hospital, the director of the County Department of
Social Services of South Carolina and the hospital. They were charged with conspiring or acting
in concert with the obstetrician. Id.
98. Id. at 610.
99. Id. at 612. The fourth circuit reversed a 85.00 nominal damages jury award to this
plaintiff on the ground that the requisite state action was lacking. Id. at 613.
100. Id. at 611. The doctor had written to the Department of Social Services asking that a
caseworker speak to the plaintiff about sterilization. There was conflicting evidence about
whether the caseworker offered to find her another doctor or said there was nothing that he
could do. Nevertheless, she consented to sterilization. She testified that she did not protest
because she felt that it would have been futile. Id.
101. See LITTLEWOOD, supra note 1, at 109. It is not surprising then that when one of the
plaintiffs in Walker called another doctor, he was not taking new patients. Walker v. Pierce, 560
F.2d 609, 611 (4th Cir. 1977).
102. Id. Justice J. Butzner, dissenting in part, quotes one witness' testimony as to Dr.
Pierce's introduction before performing an obstetrical exam:
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upheld his policy, requiring sterilization as a condition to medical services
for any woman pregnant with a third child who was either receiving assist-
ance or unable to pay her own bill. In so doing, it stated that:
We perceive no reason why Dr. Pierce could not establish and pursue the
policy . . . Nor are we cited to judicial precedent or statute inhibiting this
personal economic philosophy. Particularly is this so when all persons com-
ing to him as patients are seasonably made fully aware of his professional
attitude toward the increase in offspring and his determination to see it
prevail. At no time is he shown to have forced his view upon any
mother. 104
The fourth circuit's sanction of Dr. Pierce's "personal economic
philosophy" also tacitly gave approval to the economic incentive involved in
his sterilization policy. The court noted that within one and one-half years,
Dr. Pierce had been reimbursed $60,000 by the government for medicaid
"services." 105 Out of forty medicaid deliveries by Dr. Pierce, seventeen
sterilizations were performed and at least sixteen of these were performed
on black women. 1 0 6  Yet, the court ultimately found that there was no con-
stitutional or statutory violation in the practice of conditioning necessary
medical services for medicaid patients upon their consent to sterilization. 107
He came in and he hadn't examined me or anything. I was laying on the table.
And, he said, "listen here young lady'." He said, "This is my tax money paying for
something like this." He said, "I am tired of people going around here having
babies and my tax money paying for it." He said, "So, if you don't want this done,
you go and find yourself another doctor."
Id. at 614. It is significant that Dr. Pierce received $60,000 in Medicaid fees for a one and
one-half year period. Id. at 612. Perhaps his tax concern was not the motivating factor in condi-
tioning obstetrical care for Medicaid patients upon acceptance of sterilization.
103. The lower court entered judgment on a jury verdict for $5.00 and denied declaratory or
injunctive relief regarding Dr. Pierce's alleged sterilization or threat of sterilization of the plain-
tiffs on account of their race and number of children.
104. Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1977).
105. Id. at 612.
106. Id. at 612 n.4.
107. Id. at 613. The court found that Dr. Pierce was not acting under color of state law
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The dissent distinguished Dr. Pierce's role as a physi-
cian treating isolated patients and his role as a participant in the fiscal and administrative as-
pects of the Medicaid program. A sufficient nexus between the state and the challenged action
of the defendant was found. The court applied the principal that action under color of law may
be found when the state is involved in the activity or the private actor assumes a state or public
function. Id. at 614-15 (citations omitted).
The dissenting justice found that Dr. Pierce's policy of sterilization for economic reasons
established that he was acting under color of state law. Dr. Pierce's activity consisted of grant-
ing or denying Medicaid benefits for fiscal reasons unrelated to health Since the state is re-
sponsible for ascertaining entitlement for Medicaid benefits, the dissent reasoned that Dr. Pierce
assumed a state function. An additional factor was that South Carolina did not contract with
1979J
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Surely, however, a sterilization decision based upon such a condition is not
voluntary within the meaning of Congress' statutory mandate that federally
funded family planning services be requested voluntarily. 108
The decision of another civil rights action, Madrigal v. Quilligan,10 9 also
appears to have condoned sterilization abuse. In Madrigal, ten Mexican
women brought a § 1983110 civil rights action against the University of
Southern California (USC-LA) County General Hospital and its director of
Obstetrics and Gynecology for sterilizing them without first obtaining their
informed consent.'l The court, acting as trier of fact, characterized the suit
as resulting from a breakdown in communications which was largely due to
the plaintiffs' limited ability to understand and speak English. 112  Although
the court noted that most members of the staff at the Medical Center were
familiar with the Spanish language and that an interpreter was available, the
staff was excused because "even with these precautions misunderstandings
are bound to happen." 113
Additionally, the Madrigal court remarked that the Mexican culture de-
fined a woman's worth largely in terms of her ability to produce chil-
dren. 114  While recognizing that this factor rendered the sterilization deci-
sion more difficult and traumatic and thus necessitated greater explanation,
advice, and care when interpreting the patient's consent, the court pardoned
the staff of this "busy metropolitan hospital" for not making such an ef-
fort. 115 Accepting the doctors' testimony that they acted in good faith in
physicians directly but allowed doctors to accept or reject the Medicaid patient seeking their
services. Since the state did not know of the relationship until a bill was presented, the state
delegated much of its administrative responsibility for the operation of Medicaid to the doctors.
Therefore, the dissent concluded that Dr. Pierce assumed a state administrative function by
conditioning medical benefits on requirements not related to health, while publicly representing
himself as a qualified Medicaid practitioner. Finally, the justice noted that Dr. Pierce was free
to decline to treat any Medicaid patient but chose not to do so and was paid. 1d. at 614-15
(Butzner, J., dissenting).
10&. The court's decision does not reveal whether this argument was presented. Congress,
however, included in every section mentioning family planning a requirement that such services
be voluntarily requested. 42 U.S.C. §§ 302a-5, 602(a)(15), 708(s)(1396d)(a)(4).
109. No. CV 75-2057-JWC (D. Cal., filed June 30, 1978).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 recognizes a cause of action for violation of civil rights under color of
state law.
111. Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. CV 75-2057-JWC, slip op. at 8 (D. Cal., filed June 30, 1978).
Two of the plaintiffs were dismissed. Of the remaining eight women, six consented to steriliza-
tion while they were in labor, one woman's husband consented on behalf of his wife, and one
womnan never signed a consent form.
112. Id. slip op. at 6.
113. Id. The court also found that the cultural background of the plaintiffs contributed to the
problem "in a subtle but very significant way." Id. One predominant trait of the Mexican cul-
ture is extreme dependence upon the family. In addition, the status of the woman in the family
is determined by her ability to reproduce, rendering the sterilization decision more difficult. Id.
slip op. at 7.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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obtaining and believing the consent, the court found that this good faith
belief absolved them from liability. 116
The court also noted that even if it were shown that the plaintiffs did not
actually intend to consent, a negligent interpretation of the plaintiffs' com-
munications which indicated consent to sterilization would shield the doctors
from liability. 117 The court reasoned that liability in this situation could be
predicated only upon conduct which was malicious or constituted reckless
disregard of the patient's constitutional rights.118
The results obtained in Madrigal and Pierce illustrate that sometimes
courts are reluctant to redress the wrong perpetrated by sterilization abuse.
Moreover, civil rights actions are remedial in nature and thus do nothing to
actually prevent abuses. The only present alternative, therefore, seems to be
the future passage of regulations in this area.
116. 1d. slip op. at 4. Although the court found requisite state action, this good faith belief
entitled the doctors to immunity under the qualified immunity doctrine enunciated in Downs v.
Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1978). There, a deaf woman was sterilized after she
explicitly refused to consent. On remand, the jury found for the doctor. The first circuit recog-
nized that the doctor involved was entitled to qualified immunity, dependent on the kind of
conduct involved, which was a question for the jury. Id. at 11. Qualified immunity shields
certain state officers from damage liability for official actions taken in good faith. Id.
117. Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. CV 75-2057-JWC, slip op. at 6 (D. Cal., filed June 30, 1978).
118. Id. Relying again on Downs, the Madrigal court noted that the defendant doctor would
have been acting maliciously if he or she had ignored the plaintiff's desires in determining that
sterilization was necessary for their own good or the good of society. Liability also would have
existed if the doctor attempted to take advantage of the plaintiff's mental and communication
limitations to unduly influence their decision. I.
The Downs court, however, defined malicious as "callousness" or wanton neglect and reckless
indifference to the rights of individual citizens. Indeed, it specifically noted that the determina-
tion of whether the conduct at issue was wanton or reckless depended in part on the context in
which it occurred, including the inability of the victim to protect herself. Thus, the Downs
court evaluated the doctor's conduct and recognized the "extraordinary degree of helplessness of
the plaintiff." Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 12 (1978).
The plaintiff in Downs was deaf and had a limited ability to communicate. The plaintiffs in
Madrigal also had a limited ability to communicate due to a language barrier. It seems that if
the Madrigal court had considered the inability of these plaintiffs to protect themselves in a
foreign environment where a foreign language was spoken, the result may have been different.
The Madrigal court also refused to consider the doctor's conduct in' the context in which it
occurred. Although most of these women were in labor when their consent was obtained, the
court characterized the notion that a woman would not be able to give informed consent while
in labor as a "'statement [which] completely defies common sense." Madrigal v. Quilligan, No.
CV 75-2057-JWC, slip op. at 18 (1. Cal., filed June 30, 1978). The court accepted as more
credible the testimony of the defendant doctors that informed consent depended on man' facts,
and a decision about whether consent was informed was a judgment best made by "someone
present at the moment the decision is made." 1d. slip op. at 19. The court also cited evidence
that the attending physician was "probably" in the best position to make a judgment since "he
would be acutely aware of the necessity of having the patient's consent." Id. This is contrary to
California's precedent regarding informed consent. See notes 178-187 and accompanying text
infra.
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A PROPOSED REGULATORY SCHEME To ENSURE AN
INFORMED AND VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION DECISION
Given the evidence of past abuse and lax enforcement of existing HEW
regulations, it is submitted that state legislation regulating informed consent
to sterilization is necessary. The suggested scheme 119 provides for uniform
application, disclosure of information, and enforcement. These proposals will
be liscussed further in the following sections.
Sterilization Defined
State regulations should ensure that sterilization be both available and
chosen voluntarily. To be most effective, the regulations should apply to all
sterilizations and eliminate the distinction l)etween therapeutic and non-
therapeutic sterilizations. Since any sterilization can be defined medically as
therapeutic, this demarcation easily could be abused.120 Furthermore,
there is no reason why a "therapeutic" sterilization should not also be a
voluntary and informed one. As the court in Reif v. Weinberger 121 noted
when abolishing the therapeutic distinction in federally financed steriliza-
tions, Congress contemplated no such distinction when it established the
voluntary requirement. 122
Hysterectomy is another procedure which easily can be defined as medi-
cally therapeutic. Although the number of these operations is rapidly in-
119. See the appendix following this comment.
120. HEW previously regulated only non-therapeutic sterilizations. Therapeutic sterilization,
as defined by the 1974 HEW regulations was a necessary part of the treatment of an existing
illness or injury or medically indicated as an accompaniment of an operation on the female
genito-urinary tract .... 39 Fed. Reg. 4,732 (1974) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. 50.202(b)).
This definition excluded post caesarean sterilizations from informed consent regulation. This
type sterilization is, however, a major source of abuse. See HRG S'ruoY, supra note 18, at 4.
The -medical indication" for sterilization due to caesarean section is discredited in the litera-
ture. Id. at 10. Its complication rate is very high: 51.1% if performed with a tubal ligation and
71.4% if performed with a hysterectomy. See Tappan, supra note 21, at 155. Thus, the distinc-
tion between therapeutic and non-therapeutic serves no purpose for informed consent. Only
emergency sterilization for uterine rupture and other immediate life threatening situations
should be exempt firom the regulations. Indeed, one writer notes, "[a] growing tendency to
broaden the medical indications is evident so that, in some instances, these may be merely a
camouflage for socioeconomic reasons". Adams, Female Sterilizations, 89 Am. J. OBSTETS. &
GYN. 395 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Adamsl. In an apparent response to this criticism, HEW's
1978 regulations define sterilization as any medical procedure, treatment, or operation for the
purpose of rendering an individual permanently incapable of reproducing. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,149
(1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.202). The purpose test creates a loophole because
practitioners may avoid the restrictions of the regulations by articulating a different purpose.
HEW responded to the alternative "has the effect of producing sterility" test by characterizing
it as too broad. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,149 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.202).
121. 372 F. Supp. 1196 ().D.C. 1974).
122. The Relf court contemplated that all sterilizations, except emergency cases, would need
a "voluntary, knowing and uncoerced consent." 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1201 (D.D.C. 1974).
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creasing, 12 3 reports indicate that one-third to two-thirds of them are un-
necessary. 1 24  Since a hysterectomy can be performed for other reasons, 125
it may be used as a covert method of sterilization. 126  Moreover, hysterec-
tomy has a greater risk of complication than other elective surgical steriliza-
tion methods. 127  Accordingly, it should not be looked upon as an appro-
priate elective sterilization procedure and should be eliminated from the
statutory definition of sterilization in a model statute. 12 8  Such a statute also
should contain a prohibition against the use of hysterectomy as an accepted
123. During a two year period from 1968 to 1970, there was a 742% increase in hysterectomy
operations at the Women's Hospital of L.A. County Medical Center. See HRG STUDY, supra
note 18, at 1. In Illinois, at least 13,228 hysterectomies were performed upon women receiving
medical assistance during a three-year period. Letter from A. Steiz, Illinois Department of
Public Aid, to Mary Kelly, March 29, 1979.
124. Brody, Incompetent Surgery Is Found Not Isolated, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1976, at 24,
col. 1. In Saskatchewan, the Provincial College of Physicians and Surgeons organized a commit-
tee of medical and nonmedical personnel which published medical criteria for a hysterectomy.
Sterilization was not considered a medical indication of hysterectomy. See Dyck, Murphy, Road,
Boyd, Osborne, Vlieger, Korchinski, Ripley, Bromley & Innes, Effect of Surveillance on the
Number of Hysterectomies in the Province of Saskatchewan, 296 N. ENG. J. MED. 1326, 1328
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Dyck]. The committee found the number of unnecessary hysterec-
tomies performed in seven major provincial hospitals ranged from a high of 59% to a low of
17%. 1d. at 1327. Through committee action, these numbers decreased to a range of 16% to
2%. Id. See also Affidavit of Dr. Helen Rodriquez, Complaint in Intervention, Exhibit D at 6,
California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 28, 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Rodriquez Affidavit]. It generally is agreed that the number of unnecessary hysterec-
tomies is due in large part to its use on poor women as a training procedure for residents. See
HRG STUDY, supra note 18, at 2-3.
125. Dyck, supra note 124, at 1326-27.
126. HRG STUDY, supra note 18, at 32. The incentive also might be an economic one. As
Dr. Lewis states:
It seems to me inevitable . . . that in any occupation where considerable income is
available on the basis of events called operations, a small percentage of people can
well identify this as a marvelous income-producing device ...
Lavin & Busek, HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN 35 (Feb. 1973), cited in HRG STUDY, supra note 18, at
19 (emphasis added).
127. Fit To Be Tied, supra note 4, at 2.
128. HEW's proposed rules would have eliminated hysterectomy as an acceptable family
planning method. If it is performed for other reasons, however, it could be funded if the proce-
dure met the criteria of other provisions authorizing funding for medical assistance. 42 Fed.
Reg. 62,726-27 (1977).
The current regulations continue to disallow federal funding of hysterectomies solely to ren-
der an individual permanently incapable of reproducing. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,162 (1978) (to be
codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.207). Any hysterectomy performed for other reasons may be funded
if the patient is informed orally and in writing that the procedure will render her permanently
incapable of reproducing. In addition, the patient must sign a document acknowledging receipt
of the information. Id. Both the consent form and the signed receipt are necessary for federal
reimbursement. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,163 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.209(b)).
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family planning method.129 A hysterectomy should be performed only when
it is medically necessary and should not be used for contraceptive purposes.
If it is determined that a woman needs a hysterectomy for medical reasons,
it should be required by statute that she be informed she is entitled to a
second opinion from another doctor. 130 Such provisions would help reduce
the number of hysterectomies which are of questionable necessity.
Information Necessary to the Sterilization Decision
Restrictions on access to or information about alternative birth control
methods necessarily increase the potential for sterilization abuse. If tempor-
ary forms of birth control are not explained, a person who presently does not
want children may feel compelled to "choose" sterilization rather than risk a
pregnancy. As a consequence, it is imperative that alternatives are explained
and made available. New York City'31 and California regulations 132 serve as
an instructive model because they require an explanation of the advantages
and disadvantages of each alternative birth control method.
This requirement is an important one. The effective evaluation and selec-
tion of a birth control method requires more than mere explanation of the
various techniques. For example, convenience makes the "pill" the most de-
sirable method and the diaphragm the least until the many serious and life
threatening risks associated with the "pill" are revealed. 133  Similarly,
sterilization may be the most desirable because of its effectiveness. Its per-
manence and irreversibility, however, may make it less desirable than a
more temporary method, especially if abortion is available as a backup serv-
ice in the event a temporary method fails. 134
Patients should be told that sterilization is irreversible and that this means
he or she will never be able to have children again. 135  This would insure
129. Hysterectomy has a complication rate 10 to 20 times greater than that of a tubal sterili-
zation procedure. Hibbard, Sexual Sterilization by Elective Hysterectomy, 112 AM. J. OBSTETS.
& GYN. 1076, 1081 (1972). Thus, other methods are preferred.
130. California legislation provides that before any sterilization procedure is performed, the
patient must be informed of the right to a second opinion. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22,
§ 70707.4(2) (1977).
131. N.Y. CITY ADM. CODE ch. 22, § C22-5.0(2) (1977).
132. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22, § 70707.3 (1977).
133. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 1152-54 (31st ed. 1977).
134. The type of counseling a patient receives determines her decision. Dr. Quilligan, chair-
person of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department at U.S.C.-L.A. County Medical Center
told a reporter that they refused many patients requesting sterilization. When the reporter
asked how that was managed, he responded "[w]ell let's just say we counsel them so they don't
want it." Dreifus, supra note 18, at 18.
135. HEW has taken an equivocal stance on the permanence of sterilization. This is reflected
in its requirements that patients be told sterilization "is considered" to be irreversible. 43 Fed.
Reg. 52,153 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.203(a)). But see note 2 supra, which states
that tubal ligations have been reversed in rare instances. One physician performing such proce-
dures, however, noted that sterilization "should be approached with the firm expectation of
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that persons seeking sterilization are not misled into thinking their tubes can
be "untied" at some time in the future.13 6  Given the amount of misinforma-
tion concerning the permanence of sterilization, it is important that those
describing the procedure be required to give correct information. 137  There
is no room for "fudging." Since sterilization is the permanent relinquishment
of the fundamental right to procreate,1 3 8 all ambiguities as to its process and
effects should be resolved.
A model statute, therefore, should incorporate this information regarding
the irreversibility of sterilization. In addition, the advantages and disadvan-
tages, including the known and suspected side effects of each birth control
method, should be explained orally and in writing in a clear and simple
manner. Similarly, the alternative methods of sterilization and their atten-
dant risks and benefits, including known and suspected long term side ef-
fects, should be revealed.
An ideal provision would be one which is modeled after the California
regulation. 139 It would require an explanation of the risks and benefits of
the different types of sterilization procedures.14 0  This provision also would
having no more babies." Clark & Shapiro, Undoing Sterilization, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 1978, at
77.
136. Dreifus, supra note 18, at 16. Dr. Janet Winikoff, a second year resident at Cook
County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois, testified that a patient came to the clinic to get her tubes
untied as she had been told she could before surgery. Dr. Janet Winikoff, Testimony to the
Department of Health, Education & Welfare on Sterilization Regulation (February 1, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Testimony of Dr. Janet Winikoff to HEW]. Dr. Winikoff is a resident in
internal medicine and this was the second patient in a year to make this request. Since Dr.
Winikoff rarely deals with gynecological problems in internal medicine, she presumed that
numerically the two women represented the "tip of the iceberg." Id.
137. Id. See generally Dreifus, supra note 18. Women are often convinced to undergo sterili-
zation with a soft-sell pitch. Doctors attempt to minimize the dangers involved in sterilization
by "describing laparoscopies as bandaid surgery and calling tubal ligations a stitch." Fit To Be
Tied, supra note 4, at 4. For example, laparoscopic electrocoagulation of the fallopian tubes or
diathermy, which is the newest and one of the most popular sterilization techniques, causes a
syndrome of delayed complications. These include dysmenorrhea (painful menstruation), menor-
rhagia (excessive menstrual bleeding), and dyspareuria (painful intercourse), and are frequently
severe enough to require a hysterectomy. Late Effects of Sterilization Feared, MED. WORLD
NEWS, May 31, 1977, at 30. Another example is abdominal tubal ligation. This is the most
common method of postpartum sterilization because it is the easiest method to perform at the
time of childbirth. See Fit To Be Tied, supra note 4, at 2. This is major surgery and the
mortality rate is 25 per 100,000 women. Id. See also Tappan, supra note 21, at 154-55 for a
discussion of the side effects of tubal ligation. Out of 404 patients receiving tubal ligation, 40.7%
had a heavier menstrual flow and 20.8% had a more painful menses. These tubal ligations were
performed by the more traditional methods of laparoscopy and laporotomy. Id.
138. See notes 47-52 and accompanying text supra.
139. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22, §§ 70707.3-.4 (1977).
140. An example of an inadequate provision is HEW's proposed regulations which offer only
the advantages and benefits of sterilization. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,157 (1978) (to be codified in 42
C.F.R. § 50.203). Rather than indicating the long term side effects of sterilization, these regula-
tions disclose only the disadvantages and immediate risks associated with the specific procedure
to be performed.
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specify that the patient receive the following information, orally and in writ-
ing, about the various sterilization procedures: 1) the approximate length of
stay and recovery; 2) whether the procedure is new or experimental; 3) its
cost, and 4) its confirmed and suspected long term consequences.14 1  In
addition, the patient Would be given an opportunity to ask questions. Given
this data, a person can participate more fully in the sterilization decision.
To further ensure that a patient voluntarily consents to sterilization, the
person must be informed that a decision not to be sterilized will not affect
receipt of federal benefits or future medical services. 142 In addition, per-
sons must be told that consent to sterilization can be withdrawn anytime
prior to surgery.143 These additional reassurances are imperative in view of
the number of persons who have submitted to sterilization thinking it was
mandatory. This misconception existed even though the 1974 HEW regula-
tions required that patients be told orally and in writing that their steriliza-
tion decision would not affect benefits.14 4 This misconception might be
attributed in part to the complex sentence structure and use of double
negatives in the written notice.145
The linguistic complexity of the HEW notice defeats its educational pur-
pose and thus tends to confuse and intimidate the patient. If the purpose of
the notice is to inform patients that important benefits will not be lost, then
this reassurance must be understandable. Ideally, the complex provision
could be replaced with a more simple and direct statement, such as:
IF YOU DECIDE YOU DO NOT WANT TO BE STERILIZED, YOU
WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ALL BENEFITS SUCH AS WEL-
FARE, MEDICAID AND DISABILITY OR MEDICAL SERVICES.
YOUR DECISION WILL NOT CAUSE YOU TO LOSE ANY BENE-
FITS OR SERVICES. YOU CAN CHANGE YOUR MIND AT ANY
TIME BEFORE THE OPERATION.
An additional provision prohibiting the delaying or withholding of medical
services while a person is considering sterilization eliminates the potential
for "subtle manipulation." 146
141. See generally CAL. Aoi. CODE tit. 22, §§ 70707.3-.4 (1977).
142. This notice is provided for in HEW's consent form and must be given orally before the
informed consent process begins. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,157 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R.
§ 50.204(a)). See also CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22, § 70707.6(b)(1) (1977) (provides for warning in
consent form); N.Y. CrrY ADN,. CODE ch. 22, § C22-5.0(5) (1977) (provides for an oral warning).
143. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22, § 70707.6(b)(1) (1977) (provided for in the consent document);
New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation Guidelines for Female Elective Sterilization
(15) (November 1, 1975) provides for this orally and in writing.
144. Over 3,000 Indian women were sterilized in 1976. See note 13 and accompanying text
supra.
145. HEW requires the following notice: "NOTICE: your decision at any time not to be
sterilized will not result in the withdrawal or withholding of any benefits provided by programs
or projects." 43 Fed. Reg. 52,160 (1978).
146. The New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation guidelines for Female Elective
Sterilization (15) (November 1, 1975).
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The potential for manipulation also exists if the patient speaks a language
different from the counselor's or that utilized in the consent form or informa-
tional booklet. 147 Thus, a model statute should require that all information
be communicated to the patient in his or her primary language. This re-
quirement prevents the miscommunication of necessary information due to a
language barrier.
Required Waiting Period
It also is important that the patient be given time to consider this informa-
tion in a non-hospital atmosphere. Often the hospital environment itself is a
frightening and coercive experience. 148 A waiting period between the in-
formed consent process and the actual operation would mitigate these in-
timidating factors and would allow the patient adequate time to consider
options and communicate with others about the decision.
A thirty day waiting period, such as that required by the HEW 1 4  and
New York City legislation, 1 50 also would ensure that ample time is allowed
for withdrawal of consent solicited during labor, immediately post partum, or
before or after an abortion. Since these are the times when women are most
susceptible to sterilization abuse,' 5 1 the regulation should also include an
explicit prohibition against solicitation of consent during these periods. Any
147. See Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. CV 75-2057-JWC (D. Cal., filed June 30, 1978). HEW's
proposed rules only required that the consent form be in the patient's primary language, and
if this could not be done, an interpreter would be provided for assistance. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,721
(1977). The adopted 1978 rules require an interpreter only if the consent form is not in a
language the patient understands. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,169 (1978). The New York City Health and
Hospitals Corporation guidelines for Female Elective Sterilization (8) (November 1, 1975) pro-
vide that consent forms and informational material must be available in at least Spanish,
French, Chinese, Yiddish, and English. If there is no interpreter available, the patient must be
referred to another municipal hospital where one is present.
148. See Rosenfeld's Affidavit, supra note 18, at 3, where Dr. Rosenfeld reports that some
physicians use their position of authority to induce consent. To support this theory, he cited the
following argument made by Les Payne that appeared in NEWSDAY, January 2-3, 1974.
It's very easy to influence patients when you're wearing the white coat, especially
when they speak no English or are uneducated, the acting director said. They will
do what you want, particularly if you suggest to them that to do otherwise would be
a jeopardy to their health. You can twist the truth to suit your own needs. And
that's what residents in training frequently do.
Rosenfeld's Affidavit, supra note 18, at 3.
149. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,150 (1978) (to be codified in 42 CFR § 50.203).
150. N.Y. CITY ADM. CODE ch. 22, § C22-4.0 (1977). California provides for a 14-day wait.
CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 22, § 70707.5(3) (1977). It also requires that the pzatient request the
surgery "without fraud, duress or undue influence." Id. at § 70707.3(c).
151. As one resident noted, approaching a woman for sterilization during labor is expedient,
"although it's like asking a drowning person, do they want to get out of the water." Dreifus,
supra note 18, at 17. This is also true of the postpartum and abortion periods. Stearns, supra
note 92, at 3-4. A study analyzing various other studies noted that "[P]atients who are pressured
to be sterilized have shown poor adjustment." Schwyhart & Kutner, A Reanalysis of Female
Reactions to Contraceptive Sterilization, 156 J. NERvous & MENTAL DISEASE 354, 361 (1973).
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consent obtained during these times necessarily implies coercion. As previ-
ously noted, a recent survey revealed that over one-half of the responding
teaching hospitals obtained consent to sterilization when women were most
vulnerable to such abuse. The thirty day waiting period merely prevents
sterilization immediately after obtaining consent during labor. Thus, the wait
does not cause hardship or inconvenience. It does not preclude sterilization
at the time of delivery, if this is desired. It simply requires that informed
consent be obtained thirty days before delivery. 152  In addition, a model
statute should follow New York's 153 example and not allow a waiver of the
waiting period. The underlying principle should be that if one is to err at all,
it should be on the side of caution. 1 54
Minimum Age
Extreme caution should be exercised in the sterilization of minors. 1 55
Pursuant to Judge Gesell's order in Relf v. Weinberger, 156 HEW imposed a
moratorium on the use of federal funds to sterilize minors. HEW's present
rules continue this ban. 1 57  Since it is questionable whether there is an ac-
152. While HEW's proposed rules provided for a thirty day waiting period, HEW simultane-
ously proferred a seemingly logical criticism to the suggested waiting period. The Department
stated that a waiting period longer than the presently required 72 hours results in a second
hospitalization with the burden of increased cost. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,722 (1977). This criticism is
not very persuasive, since one of the most popular types of sterilization, laparoscopy, can be
performed on an out-patient basis. Late Effects of Sterilization Feared, MED. WORLD NEWS,
May 31, 1977 at 30.
Therefore, a second hospitalization would not be required for the sterilization procedure,
whether the waiting period is thirty days or 72 hours. Moreover, the thirty-day wait does not
preclude sterilization at delivery; it simply requires a woman to sign the consent form thirty
days before delivery. Thus, the thirty-day wait ensures that women will not be approached for
consent during delivery, but it does not prevent sterilizations at the time of delivery. HEW's
present rules provide for a thirty-day wait except in the case of premature delivery and
emergency abdominal surgery. In these instances, the waiting period is 72 hours. 43 Fed. Reg.
52,150 (1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.203).
153. The New York City Health and Hospital Corporation Guidelines for Female Elective
Sterilization do not provide for waiver. The City laws, however, do provide for waiver if deliv-
ery is sooner than expected or the patient is admitted for emergency abdominal surgery and has
already signed the consent form. N.Y. CITY ADM. CODE ch. 22, § 22-4.0 (2) (1977).
154. Adams, supra note 120, at 401, notes that 36% of the group studied who did not wait
the thirty day period were unhappy with the procedure as compared to 16% who did wait thirty
days and were regretful.
155. The Hospital Discharge Survey estimates that 5,700 females under 15 years of age have
been surgically sterilized. Letter from R. Weinzimer, Public Information Specialist, National
Center for Health Statistics, to Mary Keefe (March 19, 1979).
156. 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1204-05 (D.D.C. 1974). The court noted that "[m]inors ... are
undoubtedly sufficiently aware of the relevant considerations to use temporary contraceptives
that intrude far less on fundamental rights ... [T]he Court cannot find that Congress deemed
such children capable of voluntarily consenting to an irreversible operation involving the basic
human right to procreate." Id. at 1202.
157. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,151 (1973) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.203(a)).
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tual need to make sterilization available to anyone under the age of twenty-
one, 1 58 any hardship caused by a minimum age requirement is ot~tweighed
by the adverse consequences that could occur without it. 15 9 Sterilization
should be available to those under twenty-one only if its non-performance
would be life-threatening. Persons under twenty-one lack the maturity to
make such a permanent decision and thus are more prone to regret it.160 If
non-performance of sterilization is deemed life-threatening, a second medical
opinion should be required. Even with this provision, however, the poten-
tial for abuse exists. 161  Therefore, strong enforcement measures are neces-,
sary.
Enforcement
Since any regulation is ineffective unless enforced, state legislation should
contain enforcement and monitoring provisions. A stronger mechanism than
the HEW consent form, which recites that the requisite information was
conveyed, is necessary. 1 62  It does not follow from the mere recitation of
compliance that there is in fact compliance with the regulations. Signatures
on consent forms, while necessary, are not sufficient to ensure that consent
is voluntary and informed. It is not uncommon for consent to be obtained in
a perfunctory manner. Indeed, consent forms often are treated by hospital
personnel as yet another piece of "bureaucratic tedium" to be disposed of as
quickly as possible.' 63 Requiring a witness to be present during the infor-
mational session would act as a deterrence to such an attitude and resulting
practice. 1
64
158. See note 156 supra. It seems unlikely that most persons under twenty-one would have
completed their families. As the Relf court noted, minors may be aware of relevant considera-
tions to use temporary contraceptives which intrude less on fundamental rights, but such "chil-
dren" may not be capable of consenting to an irreversible operation involving the "basic human
right to procreate." 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1204-5 (D.D.C. 1974).
159. Of the mothers dissatisfied with the sterilization, 54% were twenty-five years or younger
and 81.1% were under thirty. Adams, supra note 120, at 400.
160. Id. See also note 158 supra.
161. For example, in Illinois one hundred and ten sterilizations were performed with federal
funds on persons under twenty-one, even though HEW had imposed a moratorium on such
funding. See note 93 supra. Ten of these sterilizations were performed on persons under eigh-
teen. Id.
162. The signed consent form is all that is required for reimbursement. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,167
(1978) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.204). This is HEW's enforcement provision. As an
enforcement provision to ensure that necessary information is conveyed, however, this
mechanism is weak.
163. The signing of preprinted medical consent forms is a virtually meaningless procedure.
Testimony of Dr. Janet Winikoff to HEW, note 136 supra.
164. In its comments to the proposed rules, HEW indicated that requiring an "auditor wit-
ness" to the consent procedure would he a violation of the patient's privacy. 42 Fed. Reg. 62,
722 (1977) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 50.203). This is an unfortunate characterization. A
witness would ensure that the necessary information was in fact communicated and understood.
It is a method of enforcement which HEW fails to recognize. Instead, "[t]he Department be-
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Ideally, another enforcement provision should require each agency or in-
stitution performing sterilizations to establish impartial review committees
that are composed of patient advocates as well as health professionals. 165
These members should review the consent procedure, monitor the waiting
period, and report violations to a state regional monitoring committee. 166
This committee, composed of representatives from community organizations
and health workers not employed by the involved agency, should review the
violation and take appropriate disciplinary action.
Such action, similar to the New York City167 and California provisions,' 68
should include the imposition of fines, a referral to the State Board of Medi-
lieves that while a patient should be able to have another person present during counseling and
consent sessions, respect for the patient's privacy dictates that the presence of a witness not he
mandated." Id. (emphasis added). HEW fails to consider the violation of privacy that occurs
front involuntary sterilization.
A witness provision would guard against such violations of privacy. It also would guard against
the kind of decision that was reached in Madrigal v. Quilligan, No. CV 75-2057-JWC (D. Cal.,
filed June 30, 1978). The court recognized that "whether a consent... was an informed and
voluntary decision depended on many facts, and that a judgment could best be made by some-
one present at the moment the decision was made." Id. slip op. at 19. The court, however,
stated that the attending phsyician was "probably" in the best position to make that judgment.
Id The plaintiffs disagreed. Id.
165. At least one patient advocate would be an attorney and another would be a community
representative. The physician who was requested by the patient, an independent physician, and
a registered norse also should be included.
166. This committee would publish informational material and maintain patient information
booklets in an updated fashion so that suspected and known adverse side effects and disadvan-
tages were revealed.
167. Provisions include imposition of fines up to $1,000.00, and legal proceedings to restrain,
correct, or enjoin violations. N.Y. CITY ADM. CODE ch. 22, § C22-8.0 (1977).
Perhaps as a result of the strict penalties, the New York regulations are subject to greater
attack than HEW's guidelines. Among the most outspoken opponents of sterilization guidelines,
including the waiting period, was the Chief of Obstetrics and Gynecology at Bellevue
Hospital-New York University Medical Center. This is truly ironic since the same institution
insists on a forty-five day wait for men requesting vasectomies. Caress, Freedom's Just Another
Word for Having Time to Choose, 77 HEALTH PAC. BULL. 17, 18 (May/June 1977). The Ameri-
can College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOC) and the American Medical Association
(AMA) oppose the regulations. Evanoff, supra note 71, at 20. These groups argue that the
guidelines interfere with the doctor-patient relationship. The New York doctors in Douglas v.
Holloman, No. 76 Civ. 6 (S.D.N.Y. January 1976), alleged this interference as the basis of their
suit. The case was dismissed with prejudice. Id.
The New York City regulations are being threatened by a bill intro(luced into the state legis-
latmre by the Associatiom for Volun tarv Sterilization (AVS), a population control group. Evanoff,
supra note 71, at 20. The bill attempts to change the sterilization regulations to resemble the
present HfEW regulations. The bill would provide for a 72-hour waiting period, no age limit
(the current age limit is twenty-one), and no data collection. Mark Siegal, assembly person from
Manhattan's Upper East Side and board member of the Association for Voluntary Sterilization
(AVS), introduced the bill into the New York State Legislature. AVS calls it "our compromise,"
and Planned Parenthood is supporting it. Recently, Planned Parenthood and AVS contributed
$150,000 each and, together with bank financing, set up a $750,000 loan fund for establishnent
of-inimi-lap'" clinics. "Mini-lap'" is an inexpensive out-patient female sterilization technique (dis-
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cal Quality Assurance, and possible revocation or suspension of the institu-
tion's license. In addition, the regional committee could take equitable ac-
tion to restrain or correct the violations. The regional committees also should
be responsible for maintaining and publishing statistics on the demographic
characteristics of patients and their morbidity for use in evaluation of indi-
vidual programs. On the basis of this evaluation, the committee can then
take the appropriate action to correct violations or improve procedures.
CHALLENGES TO REGULATIONS:
SUITS BY STATE MEDICAL ASSOCIATIONS
In enacting state sterilization regulations to prevent stertilization abuse,
legislatures should be cognizant of the challenges which may be presented
by various physician's associations. For example, in California Medical As-
sociation v. Lackner,169 the California Medical Association (CMA) challenged
sterilization regulations promulgated by the California Department of Health
(DOH). The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
and its California constituents 170 filed amicus curiae briefs in opposition to
the regulations arguing that they interfered with the doctor's right to prac-
tice medicine.171 The major issue in dispute was whether specific statutory
authority existed for the regulation of medical practice.172 If "public health"
arthermy). Planned Parenthood's share reportedly comes from its fund for establishing abortion
clinics. Planned Parenthood's support for the change in sterilization regulations is reportedly
due to its plan to open a "mini-lap" clinic in New York City which has been delayed because it
refuses to comply with the New York City Guidelines. Id.
168. California regulations authorize a referral to the State Board of Medical Quality Assur-
ance. CAL. ADIM. CODE tit. 22, §§ 51305.7(b), 70707.8 (1977). The Board regulates conduct of
individual practitioners and judges their ability to continue holding a license when questions of
performance are brought before it. California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099, slip op. at
15 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 24, 1978). California also provides for possible suspension of the
hospital's license. CAL. ADni. CODE tit. 22, § 70707.8 (1977).
169. No. 268099 (Cal. Super Ct. April 28, 1978).
170. Other groups filing amicus curiae were: California Society of Anesthesiologists, the
American Urological Association Inc., and Los Angeles Obstetrical and Gynecological Society,
Inc.
171. An example of this alleged interference is found in CMA's belief that the regulation
requiring consent information to be in the patient's primary language is a "particularly onerous
requirement." Complaint in Intervention at 8, California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099
(Cal. Super. Ct. April 28, 1978).
172. Convincing DOH to adopt the regulations was no easy feat. The Coalition for the Medi-
cal Rights of Women (CMRW) petitioned the DOH in April of 1975. Although the hearings
were held in May of 1975, the final issuance of the regulations did not occur until December 1,
1977. Affidavit of Mary Foran, Complaint in Intervention, Exhibit A, California \Medical Ass'n
v. Lackner, No. 268099 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 28, 1978). During the proceeding, the DOH and
plaintiff doctors both played an adversarial role in relation to the Coalition's position that com-
prehensive regulations were needed.
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encompassed sterilization abuse, then the DOH would have authority to
regulate it under its general power to preserve the health of the public. 173
The court noted that health regulation statutes generally were given a broad
range of conduct and upheld the regulations under the rubric of public
health. 174
The Lackner court cited the two following definitions of public health as
support for its finding that the DOH had such power: (1) that which the
legislature deemed necessary to generally protect the public; and (2) the
need to protect the public from unnecessary surgery. 175 Since sterilization
abuse clearly fit within the perimeters of "unnecessary operations," 176 the
court found that the public should receive protection from such abuse. Ac-
cordingly, the court determined that the regulations sought to protect
against sterilization abuse and, therefore, were within the agency's public
health powers. 177 The court also rejected the plaintiff's attempts to charac-
terize the informed consent procedure as a form of medical practice and thus
outside the DOH's public health responsibilities.17 8  In its discussion, the
court conceded that informed consent to surgery could arise only in a medi-
cal context, but concluded that not all aspects of informed consent involved
medical practice. 179  In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that al-
though it was a question of professional care and a lack thereof which re-
sulted in a violation of professional duty, the physician's judgment regarding
informed consent was measured by the patient's need.'8 0 Thus, whether
consent was informed was not to be measured solely by the individual doc-
tor's determination of what was relevant information.
173. California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099, slip op. at 45 (Cal. Super. Ct. April
28, 1978). CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14193 (West Supp. 1978) also authorized DOH to
promulgate regulation of sterilizations for medical patients.
174. California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099, slip op. at 14 (Cal. Super. Ct. April
28, 1978). The Coalition and DOH argued that given the documented widespread abuse as a
threat to public health, the DOH had the power to issue the regulations to protect and preserve
the public health. Id.
175. The court relied on Barkin v. Board of Optometry, 269 Cal. App. 2d 714, 729. 75 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 343 (1969), for defining "public" in public health as being broad enough to "necessar-
(ily] provide the protection to the public which the Legislature sought to provide." People v.
Rehman, 253 Cal. App. 2d 119, 153-54, 61 Cal. Rptr. 65, 87 (1967), was cited for the proposi-
tion that public health is the need to protect the public from "unnecessary operations...
which had for [its] motives avarice and greedy expectation of financial gain or other sinister
purposes.
176. California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099, slip op. at 14-15 (Cal. Super. Ct. April
28, 1978).
177. Id. slip op. at 15-16.
178. Id. The doctors also argued that the regulations constituted a regulation of medical prac-
tice which only the Board of Medical Quality Assurance had the power to control. Id. slip op. at
13.
179. Id. slip op. at 16.
180. Id.
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In its analysis, the Lackner court adopted 181 the Cobbs v. Grant 182 defi-
nition of informed consent. In Cobbs, the court defined the patient's need as
the information material to the decision to undergo a surgical
procedure.' l 3  The Cobbs court rejected the notion that physicians
have unbridled discretion to withhold information from patients and defined
"material" to include the procedure's potential peril.18 4  Moreover, the
court found that unlimited physician discretion is irreconcilable with the
"basic right of the patient to make the ultimate informed decison regarding
the course of treatment to which he knowledgably consents to be sub-
jected." 185 Finding that the physician's position as an expert required dis-
closure of the procedure's inherent risks and benefits, the court determined
that once this disclosure was made, the expert's function was complete. 186
Since weighing these risks is not an expert skill, the court held that the
evaluation and decision was a non-mnedical judgment reserved to the patient
alone.1 8 7  Therefore, the Lackner court, adopting Cobb's definition, found
that the regulation of informed consent was an authorized regulation of med-
ical practice. '88
The last major issue the Lackner court dealt with was whether the doctors
had standing to assert the privacy rights of their patients. 189 In holding that
the doctors did not have the requisite standing, the court distinguished the
abortion and birth control cases from the sterilization situation.' 9 0 The is-
sue, as stated by the court, was:
whether, when the state determines that a particular group has abused
another group, in litigation arising out of regulations which seek to miti-
181. id. slip op. at 15-16.
182. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
183. Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 10-11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514-15.
184. Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10-11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 513-14.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099, slip op. at 16 (Cal. Super. Ct. April
28, 1978). Finally, in upholding the regulations, the court cited DOH's general supervisory
power over hospitals. Id. Noting that hospitals could be liable for failure to provide informed
consent, the Court held that such regulations were within the concerns specifically delegated to
DOH. Id. In addition, the court found that the waiting periods and the prohibition of consent
immediately postpartum or abortion guaranteed an unhurried decision. The auditor-witness and
public benefits provisions were found to prevent coercion. Id. slip op. at 22. The court held
that it was not its duty to examine the "wisdom" of the regulations. Id. slip op. at 13.
189. Id. slip op. at 28.
190. Id. slip op. at 30-31. The court reasoned that in each of the abortion cases, the doctor
has been convicted of a crime involved in the statutory invasion of the patient's privacy. Id. slip
op. at 30. The interests of the doctor and the patient were, therefore, identical and the doctor
was the appropriate person to raise the privacy issue. Id. slip op. at 31. See, e.g., Roe v.Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (physician had two abortion prosecutions pending against him); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (physician convicted for giving a woman contraceptive foam at the
end of a student lecture); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (physician convicted for
prescribing contraceptives).
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gate tlhe abuse, those found to be violators may oblect to the regulations
because they allege the violations and raise the rights of those the state
seeks to protect. 191
Givemi the administrative record replete with instances of' doctors violating
patients' rights of' bodily autonomy and privacy, the court found that "the
interests in the instant case were not the same." 192
Clearly the court was alluding to the record of sterilization abuse and the
medical profession's active participation in that abuse. Also implicit in the
court's holing is the recognition that doctors' interests vastly differ from
those of' their patients.193 For example, the CMA's complaint alleged that
death Might occur due to a patient's fears over "unnecessary disclosures"
which were not in the patient's "best interests." 19 It seems that the court
viewed this as an attitude of paternalism which could have devastating ef-
fects. Finding oneself irreversibly incapable of childbearing after a steriliza-
tion operation would seem to cause more emotional injury than disclosure of
irreversibility prior to sterilization. 195 Moreover, it seems that the court
recognized another diflerence between patients' a.nd physicians' interests. If
physicians protect patients by giving them only nonthreatening information,
the patient's decision is necessarily not "informed." 196
191. California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099, slip op. at 31-32 (Cal. Super. Ct. April
28, 1978). The court cited People v. Solario, 19 Cal. 3d 760, 139 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1971), in which
the court held that a burglar could not raise the privacy right of a homeowner who had been
the subject of the burglary.
192. California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No, 268099, slip op. at 31 (Cal. Super. Ct. April
28, 1978). It is not always clear with whose best interest the doctor is concerned. Doctors
working on a fee-for-service basis have an obvious financial interest in performing sterilizations.
This night interfere with the evaluation of their patient's interest and the desire to obtain a
genuinely informed consent. Complaint in Intervention at 7, California medical Ass'n v. Lack-
ner, No. 268099 (Cal. Super. Ct. April 28, 1978). As Dr. Rosenfeld aptly put it, recent events
have shown unquestionably that medicine, like all professions, has its unscrupulous. Rosenfeld's
Affidavit, supra note 18, at [5.
193. California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099, slip op. at 14-16 (Cal. Super. Ct. April
28, 1978), citing Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
194. Plaintiff's Complaint for Preliminary Injunction, Permanent Injunction, Writ of Mandate
and Declaratory Relief, California Medical Ass'n v. Lackner, No. 268099 (Cal. Super. Ct. April
28, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Complaint for Preliminary Injunction].
195. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). In that case, a 16 s,,ear old was sterilized
pursuant to a court order. Her mother alleged she was "somewhat retarded" and promiscuous.
Linda was told she was having an appendectomy, She sued the Judge who ordered the steriliza-
tion after she discovered the true nature of the surgery. The Supreme Court held that the
judge was immune from liability. 1d.
196. An example of nondisclosure for the patient's "protection" can be found in Dr.
Winikoff's experiences as a inedical student. While rotating through gynecology, she observed
consistent, systeniatic overestimation of fibroid tumor size. This resulted in more uteri removed
for "imedical reasons." Patients were never told that the fibroids could be expected to shrink
after menopause. Testimony of Dr. Janet Winikoff to HEW, supra note 136. The CMA argued
that patients' rights and interests were fully protected by the existing duty of the physician to
obtain informed consent; therefore, the regulations served no benefit. Plaintiff's Complaint for
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CONCLUSION
Regulations aimed at sterilization abuse are necessary to ensure that per-
sons receive all the information needed to make an informed and voluntary
decision about sterilization. The doctrine of informed consent is indeed the
explicit recognition that doctors and patients have different interests. Health
care consumers must protect their interests and assert their right to decide
whether or not to procure a particular health service. One such decision is
whether to terminate the ability to procreate. Due to the history of steriliza-
tion abuse and the resulting loss of the individual's right to decide free from
coercion and manipulation, it is time for the state to take an active role in
prohibiting such abuses in this area through state regulation of informed
consent to sterilization.
Preliminary Injunction, supra note 194, at 6. Note, however, that under this "existing duty for
doctors in California an unusual number of Chicanos were told that [they] would die if they did
not submit [to sterilization]."Dreifus, supra note 18, at 15-16. These women were misinformed,
since tubal ligation is one of the few operations that is 99% effective. 1d. at 15.
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APPENDIX
Proposed Sterilization Regulations
A. Definitions
1. Sterilization means any procedure, treatment, or operation which has the effect of render-
ing or whose purpose is to render an individual permanently incapable of reproduction. Hys-
terectomy is not considered an appropriate procedure for this purpose nor should it be used for
contraceptive purposes.
2. Patient means any person 21 years or older who is legally capable of giving his or her
consent. No patient shall be denied sterilization because of marital status, age, or number of
children. No one shall be deemed capable of giving consent unless 1) they are twenty-one years
of age or older; or 2) they are under twenty-one, but such sterilization is necessary to avoid a
life-threatening condition. In this instance, a second opinion from another doctor is required.
B. Conditions
1. Medical services or other benefits cannot be delayed or withheld while a person is consid-
ering sterilization.
2. Solicitation of consent to sterilization is forbidden. The operation must be requested by
the patient without fraud, duress, or undue influence.
3. Initial consent may not be obtained from a female patient during admission or hospitaliza-
tion for childbirth or abortion. It may not be obtained from a person whose judgment is
significantly altered, whether due to medication, emotional status, or impaired sensorium.
4. Informed Consent for Sterilization requires that the patient understand the risks and ben-
efits of all alternative, reversible methods of controlling conception. Every patient must par-
ticipate in an informational session conducted by someone other than a physician, preferably a
registered nurse or other properly trained individual. Every patient must be given all the in-
formation necessary and required in this section and the information which is contained in the
consent form.
5. Written informed consent for sterilization must be obtained. The initial consent form must
be signed by the patient, witness, and physician, after the informational session is conducted.
C. Application
This title shall apply to every sterilization performed in this state, except emergency steriliza-
tion, which is an immediate life-saving measure. An emergency which requires sterilization as
an immediate life saving measure includes, but is not limited to, rupture of the uterus or
uterine cancer. In all instances there should be evidence of pathology.
D. Waiting Period
A sterilization may not be performed sooner than 30 days after the initial informed consent
was given by the patient.
E. Informed Consent
No sterilization shall be performed which does not meet the following conditions:
1. The patient must be informed orally and in writing:
IF YOU DECIDE YOU DO NOT WANT TO BE STERILIZED YOU WILL
CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ALL BENEFITS, SUCH AS WELFARE, MEDICAID
AND DISABILITY, AND MEDICAL SERVICES. YOUR DECISION WILL NOT
CAUSE YOU TO LOSE ANY BENEFITS OR SERVICES. YOU CAN CHANGE
YOUR MIND AT ANY TIME BEFORE THE OPERATION.
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The consent form shall be signed by the patient at least 30 days after initial consent was given,
indicating his or her reaffirmation of the desire to be sterilized. Such consent form shall be
signed by the physician and the witness. The consent form shall contain the following informa-
tion:
a. The advantages and disadvantages of sterilization, suspected and known long
term side effects;
d. notice that benefits and services cannot be withdrawn on the basis of the sterili-
zation decision;
c. that the patient can withdraw consent at any time prior to sterilization;
d. that sterilization is not reversible and that the patient will never again be able to
have children;
1. This information must be in bold type on the consent form:
STERILIZATION MEANS THAT YOU WILL NEVER AGAIN BE ABLE TO
HAVE CHILDREN. IT IS PERMANENT AND NOT REVERSIBLE. YOU CAN
CHANGE YOUR MIND AND WITHDRAW CONSENT AT ANY TIME BEFORE
SURGERY;
e. that the physician does not guarantee that the procedure always will be
successful and occasionally it does fail; and
f. that the patient has a right to a second medical opinion.
2. A witness' presence is required when the patient signs the consent form and the form
must be read aloud before the patient signs it. The patient will be encouraged to bring a friend
or family member as a witness; but if the patient does not do so, the hospital or agency will
provide one.
3. All information in the consent form and in the informational session must be communi-
cated orally and in writing in the patient's primary language. Informed consent cannot be ob-
tained until this is accomplished, and if this is impossible, an interpreter must be made avail-
able.
F. Informational Session and Booklet
The following must be explained orally and in writing before consent may be obtained.
1. The above two notices as to benefits, services, permanence, and irreversibility of steriliza-
tion must be given.
2. The patient must be informed of:
a. Alternative methods of controlling contraception and their risks and benefits, in-
cluding abortion;
b. Alternative sterilization procedures and their attendant risks and benefits, as well
as suspected and known immediate and long term side effects;
c. The fact that hysterectomy is not considered an appropriate family planning
method; and
d. Her right to a second opinion if she is advised to have a hysterectomy for medi-
cal reasons.
3. The following will be discussed with respect to the various procedures:
a. types of anesthesia;
b. approximate length of time in the hospital for recovery;
c. whether the procedure is new or experimental;
d. the cost; and
e. an explicit offer to answer any questions.
4. All patients must reaffirm their request and consent to sterilization upon admission to the
hospital or clinic.
5. All sterilizations must be reported to the State Regional Review Committee and the Office
of Quality Assurance (or other state reporting agency regulating the conduct and licensing of
individual practitioners).
G. Enforcement and Monitoring
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1. Any person violating these regulations can be fined up to $2,500.
2. Each facility performing sterilizations shall have a review committee composed of patients'
advocates consisting of 1 attorney and 2 community representatives, and health professionals not
employed by the agency involved. This committee shall review the informed consent procedure
for each sterilization performed at its particular facility. The committee shall report to the Board
of Medical Quality Assurance the name of any physician who performs a sterilization procedure
which does not comply with these regulations. Any violation also shall be reported to the State
Regional Review Committee.
3. Noncompliance with these regulations may result in revocation or suspension of the hospi-
tal or clinic's license, as well as the physician's license.
4. The State Regional Review Committee shall be composed of representatives fron 4 com-
munity organizations, 4 health workers consisting of at least one registered nurse and one social
worker or psychologist, and two attorneys. None of these persons shall be employed by the
hospital, clinic, or physician involved.
5. The Regional Review Committee shall publish the informational booklet to be used in the
informed consent process.
6. Counsel for the Regional Review Committee may institute legal proceedings to restrain,
correct, or enjoin any violation of these regulations. Such actions may be entered into any court
of civil jurisdiction within the state or within the review committee's region.
In such actions, counsel may apply for restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and other
provisional remedies with or without notice.
7. This state shall have a Regional Committee for every region. Each region shall collect
numbers of sterilizations and record information as to age, sex, and race. These data shall be
public record. Each consent form shall be reviewed for compliance with these regulations and
the patient's privacy shall be protected. Every six months the Regional Committees shall con-
duct an audit of the individual facility review committee's records and consent forms.
